Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

9-2022

A Methodological Framework for Parametric Combat Analysis
Dustin L. Hayhurst Sr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Systems Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Hayhurst, Dustin L. Sr., "A Methodological Framework for Parametric Combat Analysis" (2022). Theses
and Dissertations. 5555.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/5555

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMETRIC COMBAT
ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Dustin L. Hayhurst Sr., Major, USAF
AFIT-ENV-DS-22-S-085
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S.
Government. This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject
to copyright protection in the United States.

AFIT-ENV-DS-22-S-085

A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMETRIC COMBAT
ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Systems Engineering and Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Dustin L. Hayhurst Sr., BS, MS
Major, USAF

September 2022
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A.
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT-ENV-DS-22-S-085

A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMETRIC COMBAT
ANALYSIS

Dustin L. Hayhurst Sr., BS, MS
Major, USAF

Committee Membership:

John M. Colombi, PhD
Chair

Christine M. Schubert Kabban, PhD
Member

Lt Col Robert A. Bettinger, PhD
Member

David W. Meyer
Member

ADEDEJI B. BADIRU, PhD
Dean, Graduate School of Engineering and Management

AFIT-ENV-DS-22-S-085
Abstract

This work presents a taxonomic structure for understanding the tension between certain
factors of stability for game-theoretic outcomes such as Nash optimality, Pareto optimality,
and balance optimality and then applies such game-theoretic concepts to the advancement
of strategic thought on spacepower. This work successfully adapts and applies combat
modeling theory to the evaluation of cislunar space conflict. This work provides evidence
that the reliability characteristics of small spacecraft share similarities to the reliability
characteristics of large spacecraft. Using these novel foundational concepts, this
dissertation develops and presents a parametric methodological framework capable of
analyzing the efficacy of heterogeneous force compositions in the context of space warfare.
This framework is shown to be capable of predicting a stochastic distribution of numerical
outcomes associated with various modes of conflict and parameter values. Furthermore,
this work demonstrates a general alignment in results between the game-theoretic concepts
of the framework and Media Interaction Warfare Theory in terms of evaluating force
efficacy, providing strong evidence for the validity of the methodological framework
presented in this dissertation.
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A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMETRIC COMBAT
ANALYSIS
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
The United States now contends with peer competitors within a multipolar
geopolitical order in the context of an emerging space warfare domain and as such the
United States requires an effective force composition in order to deter or win a potential
future space conflict. The development of a military which presents an effective force
composition is an immense, multidimensional undertaking with many efforts including
combat modeling. Combat modeling in and of itself is a vast field including such spheres
as agent-based modeling, high-fidelity physics-based modeling, and parametric
modeling. A specific and important niche within parametric combat modeling is that field
of parametric combat modeling which utilizes differential equations to characterize the
numerical outcomes of conflicts – here referred to as differential parametric combat
modeling. The importance of differential parametric combat modeling lies in its elegance
which allows it to produce results quickly without the use of computationally intensive,
sophisticated, expensive, or licensed software or hardware. Such elegance allows
differential parametric combat modeling to be executed diffusely in an operationally and
strategically-relevant timeframe.
The original developer of differential parametric combat modeling, Lanchester,
published his seminal work, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm, in 1916.
(Lanchester, 1916) Within the next decade, Lotka and Volterra were researching
biomathematics and theoretical ecology, independently developing models which used
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differential equations to characterize predator-prey interactions and interspecific
competition. (Kingsland, 2015) By 1959, Brackney developed models in the same mold
to integrate the fog of war concept and directly map physical phenomena to parameter
values. (Brackney, 1959) Despite this progress, all of these models relied on homogenous
force structures within each belligerent to be effective. In 1970, Bonder and Farrell
attempted to solve the heterogeneous force structure problem but, by their own
admission, were not able to close the gap despite a noble effort which made valuable
contributions to the field. (Bonder & Farrell, 1970)
Differential parametric combat modeling is a form of aggregated combat
modeling since, as Washburn and Kress assert, “Combat models are sometimes described
as ‘aggregated’ or ‘high resolution,’ but aggregation should really be measured on a
continuous scale… To the extent that dissimilar things are treated as if they were
identical, the model is said to be more or less aggregated.” (Washburn & Kress, 2009)
The aforementioned works of Lanchester, Lotka, Volterra, Brackney, Bonder, and Farrell
certainly utilize a significant degree of aggregation. As a developer or user of combat
modeling pushes a particular model down the continuum towards greater aggregation, it
is of vital importance that the aggregation is conducted in such a manner so as to not
warp the accurate representation of the underlying physical phenomena. While the past
luminaries of differential parametric combat modeling were unable to effectively
aggregate heterogeneous force structures, this dissertation effectively addresses
heterogeneity using game-theoretic mixed strategies as population parameters. Such an
approach preserves the value of aggregation within combat modeling without sacrificing
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the accurate representation of the underlying phenomena. Naturally, this methodology
requires the establishment of those population parameters. Probability theory, specifically
reliability modeling, is utilized within this work to determine the necessary population
parameters for the game-theoretic approach. The methodological framework then, is a
mathematical construct which ties the aforesaid elements together in a coherent manner
so as to enable effective parametric combat analysis. Throughout this dissertation, the
elements of the framework and the framework itself are contextualized to the space
warfare domain.
1.2 Problem Statement
Current approaches within differential parametric combat modeling cannot
effectively distill heterogeneous force structures into the necessary parameter values.
Given the heterogeneous nature inherent to modern militaries, such a gap limits the
effectiveness of differential parametric combat modeling in analysis, wargaming, and
game-theoretic system design.
1.3 Research Objective
The research objective of this work is to create a methodological framework for
the analysis of space conflict between two heterogeneous belligerents using differential
parametric combat modeling.
1.4 Research Questions
The research questions which arose from this objective throughout the pertinent
course of work include:
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1. How can game theory inform spacepower?
2. How can aggregated combat models be applied to space conflict?
3. What similarities exist between the reliability models of large and small
spacecraft?
4. How can game theory, aggregated combat models, and reliability models be
integrated to provide analysis for space combat?
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
1.5.1 Understanding the Difference between the Framework, Analysis,
Wargaming, and Game-Theoretic System Design.
The framework presented in this work, when used skillfully, is useful for analysis,
wargaming, and game-theoretic system design while being definitively distinct from
those entities. The framework is a tool whereas the latter three are processes for which
the tool may be used. The thrust of this dissertation is the development of the framework
rather than the execution of those three processes. Despite the use of notional analyses to
demonstrate the framework, the distinction between the framework and the analysis
should always be kept in mind. Furthermore, although the framework could be used in
wargaming or game-theoretic system design, those processes are not used to demonstrate
the framework and are distinct from both each other as well as analysis. Combat analysis
provides descriptive results based on some set of conditions and may serve to implicitly
inform the user. Wargaming is an abstraction of warfare which requires dynamic in-theloop human decision-making. (Perla & Curry, 2011) As the name suggests, game-
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theoretic system design is the use of game theory to design a system and is an explicitly
prescriptive process.
1.5.2 The Abstraction of Warfare.
The framework presents a mathematical construct which asserts the ability to
conduct combat analysis and predict a distribution of quantitative outcomes. This work
stands on the intellectual shoulders of such luminaries as Lanchester, Brackney, Lotka,
Volterra, and Bonder while seeking to advance their seminal concepts. To that end, this
work assumes that, to an extent, the chaos and complexities of combat may be distilled to
a mathematical representation. Of course, mathematical constructs are not capable of
perfectly representing combat; as the adage goes, all models are wrong but some are
useful.
1.5.3 Different Spheres of Modeling are Complimentary.
The parametric nature of the framework compliments rather than competes with
agent-based modeling and high-fidelity physics-based modeling. Agent-based modeling
is the programming of specific behavior into various agents and collecting the results of
the emergent behavior within the system. High-fidelity physics-based modeling
emphasizes accurately representing the physical behavior of a system in a relatively
comprehensive fashion. These various modeling approaches do not supplant each other
but could potentially enhance each other. For example, a high-fidelity physics-based
model could inform the values of a parametric model; a parametric model could provide
an initial direction for the development of a more complex agent-based model.
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1.5.4 (The Lack of) Just War Theory.
This work does not attempt to say why a belligerent should fight or even prescribe
victory conditions – although someone might use this framework in a discussion on just
war theory, such a conversation is beyond the scope of this work.
1.5.5 Media Interaction Warfare Theory.
This work asserts that the framework and Media Interaction Warfare Theory
(MIWT), a contemporary parametric modeling methodology, serve to validate each other.
Given the historical research required for the parameter values used in MIWT, MIWT
should not be considered as a replacement for any part of the framework.
Reference Figure 1.1 for a visual representation of the relationships discussed in
the Assumptions and Limitations section.

Figure 1.1. Framework Relationships Mind Map
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1.6 Dissertation Outline
This work is organized in a scholarly article format. Chapter 1 introduces the
work, Chapters 2 through 6 each present a scholarly article published or submitted for
publication, and Chapter 7 concludes the work. Chapters 2 through 4 focus on the
foundational material of the framework, Chapter 5 focuses on the validation of the
framework, and Chapter 6 integrates the framework.
Chapter 2, “Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of Spacepower,”
was published in the Air & Space Power Journal and answers research question one: how
can game theory inform spacepower? (Hayhurst & Colombi, 2021) This work is a
foundational piece of the framework because game theory is used within the framework
to distill heterogeneous force structures with corresponding pairwise attrition coefficients
into aggregate attrition coefficients for use within the differential parametric combat
models.
Chapter 3, “Aggregated Space Combat Modeling,” was published in the Journal
of Defense Modeling and Simulation and answers research question two: how can
aggregated combat models be applied to space conflict? (Hayhurst, Colombi, & Meyer,
2021) This work is a foundational piece of the framework because it demonstrates that
differential parametric combat models are effective in characterizing space combat.
Chapter 4, “Survival Analysis for Nanosatellites and Picosatellites,” was
published in the proceedings of the 35th Annual Small Satellite Conference and answers
research question three: what similarities exist between the reliability models of large and
small spacecraft? (Hayhurst, Bettinger, & Schubert Kabban, 2021) This work is a
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foundational piece of the framework because the respective reliability models are used
within the framework to establish a mixed-strategy as a population parameter for each
belligerent.
Chapter 5, “A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of Media Interaction Warfare Theory,”
is under review for publication by the Space Force Journal. This work is meaningful in
that it validates the framework by showing a general alignment of results between the
MIWT approach and the game-theoretic approach.
Chapter 6, “A Methodological Framework for Parametric Combat Analysis,” was
accepted for publication in the Space Education and Strategic Applications Journal and
answers research question four: how can game theory, aggregated combat models, and
reliability models be integrated to provide analysis for space combat? As the eponymous
chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6 brings all of the preceding elements together to
present them as one integrated framework.
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Chapter 2: Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of Spacepower
2.1 Introduction
The US space enterprise plays an integral role in maintaining the peace and
prosperity of the nation. In times of conflict, the country depends on American space
power. Leaders within the US space community advance space power through the
evaluation and execution of strategically interdependent decisions. These decisions
pertain to the technology development, acquisition, and operation of space systems and
are analogous to moves, strategies, and payoffs in multiplayer games. Using gametheoretic models, decision-makers possess the valuable opportunity to partially
manipulate game structure before stepping into the role of a player. To bolster this
hypothesis, this article presents several game-theoretic system design concepts. First, this
article contextualizes the spectrum of agent strategic interactions, from collaboration
through competitive to more antagonistic outcomes. Second, a new taxonomy for the
classification of game-theoretic models is proposed. Third, we expound on the proposed
taxonomy using eight atomic game structures and exemplify their use with pertinent
space applications.
2.2 Game Theory
Game theory dates back to work by John Von Neumann in 1928. With wide
applications in political science, economics, biology and genetics, sociology, linguistics,
and even system design, game theory is a tool to solve decision-making problems. A
game involves a set number of players, strategies (decisions, possible moves, or actions),
and a payoff or value that captures the outcome of each play per player. (Spaniel, 2015)
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The strategy or strategies for each player can be simple and small, or complicated.
Consider chess, where the number of possible moves and strategies are massive. But even
for atomic games with two players and two possible moves each, one can observe
interesting and counterintuitive scenarios and equilibria. Three important aspects of game
theory include agent utility balance, Nash equilibrium, and the Pareto front.
Agent utility balance states that an outcome holds approximately the same utility
for all agents.
Nash equilibrium relies on the conventional use of the term in the field of game
theory – a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive to
unilaterally change their current decision or move. (Spaniel, 2015) A player achieves a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (where such equilibrium exists) by playing a single
strategy. A player can achieve indifference in the other player(s) through a mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium wherein a set of pure strategies are played with some
probability. (Spaniel, 2015)
Generally, Pareto optimality exists when no single criterion can be improved
without diminishing at least one other criterion. In the case of a two-player game, the
two-dimensional Pareto front considers each agent utility as a positive asset for
maximization. The Pareto front is formed using nondominated outcomes within the
game-theoretic model. (Leyton-Brown & Shoham, 2008)
2.3 The Atomic Competitive Element Taxonomy
The Atomic Competitive Element (ACE) taxonomy presents an abstract and
descriptive decision space that illustrates contextually desirable attributes. Therefore, an
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understanding of the ACE taxonomy encompasses comprehension of that context,
specifically, agent goals and the resultant behavior. While the user may frame any gametheoretic model with the ACE taxonomy, situations containing self-interested players
(who nonetheless display a willingness to cooperate to achieve a mutually beneficial
outcome) provide the most natural fit. Close allies with a shared goal, working toward a
collaborative outcome, often diverge from the ACE taxonomy construct. Similarly,
hostiles committed to self-deleterious min-max strategies frequently eschew such a
framework. The span between these extremes – including self-interested cooperators,
competitors, and belligerents – fit naturally into the ACE taxonomy construct.
Collaborative outcomes maximize the collective utility of the agents within the
game. Close allies with a shared vision, generally common values, and a shared goal,
often work toward such outcomes; each agent sees the team success as personal success.
Under certain circumstances, such an approach can maximize both coalition and
individual utility over the long term. By maximizing team utility, collaborative outcomes
always exist on the Pareto front. Collaborative outcomes do not fit as naturally within the
ACE taxonomy framework.
Cooperative, competitive, and antagonistic outcomes always use Nash equilibria
as the baseline solution. Agents working toward a cooperative outcome are willing to
move from a Nash equilibrium to a mutually beneficial outcome with a higher utility for
both players. In a cooperative context, agents treat each other benevolently and work for
the betterment of other agents as long as the respective individual agent garners a positive
or neutral result. Cooperative outcomes generally fall on a Nash equilibrium or a Pareto
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front outcome with adequate utility balance and mutual utility improvement. They also
generally maximize individual utility within a specific game. Allies with shared interests
work together toward the same outcome. Importantly, agents within such a context need
not demonstrate altruism (i.e., agents act in self-interest), but the agents must trust each
other and act in good faith.
Naturally, competitors pursue competitive outcomes and seek to maximize
individual utility through individual effort. Competitive outcomes land on Nash
equilibria. Agents within such a context display indifference toward other agents –
seeking neither good nor harm for fellow players.
Antagonistic outcomes display the same characteristics as competitive outcomes
except that, in such a context, agents choose to harm each other when there is no cost to
do so. For example, an agent given two options with the same personal utility would
follow a min-max strategy to minimize the other agent’s utility. Cooperative,
competitive, and antagonistic outcomes, as well as the associated agent behavior,
naturally fit into the ACE taxonomy framework.
In a hostile context, adversarial players engage in a pure min-max strategy
wherein every choice minimizes the other agent’s maximum possible utility. (LeytonBrown & Shoham, 2008) When seeking a hostile outcome, agents pursue this min-max
approach even when such a strategy presents self-detrimental consequences.
Interestingly, these hostile agents are not self-interested and can be trusted to always
commit the most harmful action. Hostile outcomes and belligerents do not fit into the
ACE taxonomy construct. Reference Figure 2.1 for the spectrum of interaction among
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agents in a game.

Figure 2.1. Spectrum of Interaction
The ACE taxonomy illustrates and classifies game-theoretic models according to
three contextually desirable attributes (for the stability of an outcome), which may exist
in a particular outcome: agent utility balance, Nash equilibrium, and the Pareto front.
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The ACE taxonomy represents these three attributes with primary colors, their
combinations with secondary colors, the presence of all three attributes with white, and
the absence of all three attributes with gray. Reference Figure 2.2 for the Venn diagram
illustrating the ACE taxonomy.

Figure 2.2. Factors of Stability in Multiagent Games
2.4 Characterization of Atomic Competitive Elements
This section introduces and characterizes eight fundamental building blocks of
ACE that are significant in the formation of many higher-complexity game-theoretic
models. The user of this taxonomy may recognize each kind of ACE by its unique color
scheme based on the three properties (agent utility balance, Nash equilibrium, and the
Pareto front) present or not within each of the four outcome cells of the respective twoby-two matrix. This taxonomy does not consider game-theoretic models as unique ACE
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wherein the game designer may trivially rearrange the choices of the respective game to
achieve a repeated color scheme. Systematically categorizing game-theoretic models at a
fundamental level empowers the user to identify the scenario at hand, understand the
scenario’s dynamics, and draw upon heuristic solutions to maximize the utility for one or
more agents within the game. Specifically, this article uses this taxonomy to address
challenges and opportunities in the development of space power.
2.4.1 Deadlock.
In Deadlock, each player knows both the correct and incorrect answer and must
simply choose the correct answer. If both players choose the same answer, they earn a
neutral utility value. If one player makes an unforced error, the winning player achieves
positive utility at the expense of the losing player. Importantly, this game, as well as the
other games, are presented in a strategic form where both players must act
simultaneously; players do not know what the other player will do, and prior
communication or coordination is not guaranteed.
Perhaps the most stable and simple game-theoretic model, Deadlock contains a
single balanced pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on the Pareto front. Deadlock presents a
straightforward, intuitive scenario wherein agents converge to the Nash equilibrium with
no opportunity to improve utility through cooperation. (Spaniel, 2015) Other outcomes
within Deadlock represent unforced errors by one or more agents. Reference Table 2.1
for the game of Deadlock using the ACE taxonomy.

15

Table 2.1. Deadlock

Player Two Strategies
Deadlock
Error

Correct

Error

0, 0

-1, 1

Correct

1, -1

0, 0

Player One Strategies

2.4.2 Pure Coordination.
In Pure Coordination, players must decide to stay or go. If both players choose the
same answer, both players achieve a positive utility. If players differ in their choices,
neither benefits. The self-explanatory Pure Coordination game-theoretic model presents
an extremely stable game in the presence of effective communication with two balanced
pure-strategy Nash equilibria on the Pareto front and one mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. (Spaniel, 2015) Since the payoffs for both pure strategies hold the same
utility for each agent, players of the game display indifference in the pursuit of a
particular pure strategy and act amiably in the respective coordination. Reference Table
2.2 for the game of Pure Coordination, using the ACE taxonomy.
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Table 2.2. Pure Coordination

Player Two Strategies
Pure Coordination
Stay

Go

Stay

1, 1

0, 0

Go

0, 0

1, 1

Player One Strategies

2.4.3 Stag Hunt.
In Stag Hunt, each player must decide to hunt the stag or hunt the two hares.
Hares can be caught by one player, but the stag requires both players working together to
catch it. If each player hunts for hares, each will catch one hare and achieve a utility of
one. If both players hunt for the stag, each will achieve a utility of three, since the stag is
worth six total utility. However, if one player hunts for hares, that player will catch both
hares and achieve a utility of two, while the other player will earn nothing since they will
be unable to singlehandedly catch the stag.
Stag Hunt generally represents the synergistic effect of cooperative resource
harvesting with one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on the three-cell Pareto front, one
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium off the Pareto front, and one mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. (Spaniel, 2015) The Pareto front pure strategy presents high stability in the
presence of effective communication and the absence of adversarial intentions. In a
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similar fashion to other ACE, such as Stoplight and Chicken, this game presents the
opportunity for game-theoretic system design to expand the scope of the scenario to
achieve a higher utility for both players. The game designer may translate the strategic
form of the game to an extensive form and introduce a new branch on the first node with
outcome utility less than the utility of synergistic harvesting but greater than
individualistic harvesting. Given logical, sophisticated agents capable of forward
induction, the players will not use the new branch and will instead converge to
synergistic resource harvesting. (Spaniel, 2015) Reference Table 2.3 for the game of Stag
Hunt using the ACE taxonomy.
Table 2.3. Stag Hunt

Player Two Strategies
Stag Hunt
Stag

Hare

Stag

3, 3

0, 2

Hare

2, 0

1, 1

Player One Strategies

2.4.4 Matching Pennies.
In Matching Pennies, each player decides whether to play their coin heads-up or
tails-up. One player wins if both coins match while the other player wins if the coins do
not match.

18

Matching Pennies represents arguably the most unstable simple game-theoretic
model with no balance, one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and a four-cell Pareto front
that spans the entire decision space. In Matching Pennies, one agent attempts to match the
metaphorical penny while the other agent works to prevent the match. (Spaniel, 2015)
Reference Table 2.4 for the game of Matching Pennies using the ACE taxonomy.
Table 2.4. Matching Pennies

Player Two Strategies
Matching Pennies
Heads

Tails

Heads

1, -1

-1, 1

Tails

-1, 1

1, -1

Player One Strategies

2.4.5 Stoplight.
In Stoplight, two drivers arrive at an intersection simultaneously and must decide
whether to continue or stop. If one continues, that driver will gain a utility of one while
the other driver will be indifferent. If both players stop, both players will be mildly
annoyed and lose one utility value. If both players continue, they will cause an accident
greatly detrimental to their utility values.
Stoplight represents the quintessential game-theoretic model for the application of
correlated equilibrium with two unbalanced pure-strategy Nash equilibria on the Pareto
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front, one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, and two balanced, mutually deleterious
outcomes off the Pareto front. (Spaniel, 2015) In the Stoplight model, logical agents use a
correlated equilibrium mechanism (perceived as fair by all agents) whenever possible to
maximize overall and individual utility. Reference Table 2.5 for the game of Stoplight
using the ACE taxonomy.
Table 2.5. Stoplight

Player Two Strategies
Stoplight
Continue

Stop

Continue

-5, -5

1, 0

Stop

0, 1

-1, -1

Player One Strategies

Fundamentally, Stoplight represents the same ACE as both the Battle of the Sexes
and Volunteer’s Dilemma game-theoretic models. Stoplight addresses safe traffic flow,
Battle of the Sexes addresses coordination (or lack thereof) for an entertainment venue,
and the Volunteer’s Dilemma addresses costly intervention to help a crime victim.
(Spaniel, 2015) Effectively, since each of these game-theoretic models represents the
same kind of ACE, game agents, or the game designer may use a fair correlated
equilibrium mechanism to achieve a higher utility.
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2.4.6 Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an interrogator can convict two players of minor
crimes without a confession such that each player will spend one month in jail. The
interrogator offers a plea bargain to both suspects where they can sell out the other player
for personal leniency – if only one player takes the deal, that player will receive no time
in jail while the other player will spend 12 months in jail having been successfully
convicted of the more serious crime with the help of the defector’s confession. However,
if both players confess, their confessions are worthless, and each will receive eight
months in jail on the charges of the more serious crime.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma represents arguably the most famous game-theoretic
model with a single pure-strategy Nash equilibrium off the Pareto front. The game
demonstrates the difficulty among self-interested, untrustworthy agents in moving from
the Nash equilibrium to a balanced, mutually beneficial outcome. The difficulty in
establishing the mutually beneficial outcome lies in the opportunity for profitable
deviation by an untrustworthy agent. (Spaniel, 2015) Reference Table 2.6 for the game of
Prisoner’s Dilemma using the ACE taxonomy.
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Table 2.6. Prisoner’s Dilemma

Player Two Strategies
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Silence

Defect

Silence

-1, -1

-12, 0

Defect

0, -12

-8, -8

Player One Strategies

The Prisoner’s Dilemma forms an important conduit to understanding other gametheoretic models such as the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma, repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games, the Tragedy of the Commons, the Hawk-Dove game, and duopolistic competition.
The Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma represents an exogenous manipulation of the
traditional game and enables an agent to abstain when playing with a perceived defector
to achieve a higher utility. Repeated Prisoner Dilemma games allow for higher levels of
cooperation and more sophisticated strategies such as tit for tat; an unknown or infinite
number of Prisoner Dilemma games aids the strategic enhancement for improved utility.
Scenarios that permit proactive self-determined agent mixing (players may choose which
agent to play with from the available pool) especially increase the utility value for
cooperative agents. Robert Axelrod explored the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in
his developing notion of cooperation as an evolutionarily stable strategy. (Axelrod, 1981)
In his work with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ahmed Ibrahim contended that “evolutionary
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mechanisms have nothing to do with conflict between the causes of the tragedy and their
solutions for it, whether the solution is that of outcompeting the tragedy or its contrary.”
In considering the existence of cooperation among organisms, Ibrahim asserted the
presence of a conscious intervener. (Ibrahim, 2015)
The Tragedy of the Commons represents a more unwieldy N-player version of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma where at least one agent exploits a common resource for personal
gain to the detriment of the common resource and the community. Garrett Hardin
suggested privatization and top-down regulation (mutual coercion) as remedies,
implicitly assuming the existence of a strong, efficient central authority. (Hardin, 1968)
Elinor Ostrom focused on bottom-up institutions and articulated conditions that fostered
such cooperation: easy-to-monitor resources, moderate rates of change, robust social
networks, the ability to exclude outsiders, and a strong push for self-enforcement among
community members. (EconClips, 2018) The pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto utilized
cryptography to protect a common in the form of a public ledger. (Nakamoto, n.d.)
The Hawk-Dove game exists as a superset of three simpler games wherein the
Prisoner’s Dilemma fundamentally represents the manifestation of relatively low-cost
conflict. The game designer, by exogenous manipulation, may significantly increase the
relative cost of conflict with respect to the value of the prize to transform the Prisoner’s
Dilemma into a game of Chicken. Such a transformation creates a new set of strategies as
well as new pathways for game-theoretic system design.
The dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to some degree, check the spread of
collusion in duopolistic competition and preserve the health of a limited marketplace.
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2.4.7 Take or Share.
In Take or Share, each player must decide whether to take the pot of money or
share the pot of money worth eight dollars. If both players share, they will split the pot. If
both players take, each will receive no money. If one player takes, that player will receive
all the money while the other player receives nothing.
In the Hawk-Dove superset, Take or Share represents the knife-edge transition
from Prisoner’s Dilemma to Chicken as the relative cost of conflict increases. Outside of
artificial or discretized environments, such knife-edge equilibria do not exist. Take or
Share encompasses three pure-strategy Nash equilibria and infinitely many partially
mixed strategy Nash equilibria. (Spaniel, 2015) Reference Table 2.7 for the game of Take
or Share using the ACE taxonomy.
Table 2.7. Take or Share

Player Two Strategies
Take or Share
Share

Take

Share

4, 4

0, 8

Take

8, 0

0, 0

Player One Strategies
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2.4.8 Chicken.
In Chicken, two drivers drive toward each other at high speeds in a show of
bravado. If both drivers swerve, nothing will happen. If both continue, each will be
engulfed in a devastating accident. If one swerves, that player will be embarrassed for
having lost the intimidation game, while the player who continued will gain positive
utility in the form of a fearless reputation. Incidentally, the authors recommend against
playing the game of Chicken.
Chicken represents arguably the most fascinating simple game-theoretic model
with two unbalanced pure-strategy Nash equilibria along a three-cell Pareto front as well
as one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Generally, Chicken exists as an intimidation
game with high-value assets at stake and represents relatively high-cost conflict in the
Hawk-Dove superset. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium enables the use of
comparative statics that demonstrate a dramatic decrease in the probability of conflict for
any incremental, mutual increase in the cost of conflict. Political scientists use such
results to explain the role nuclear weapons play in peacekeeping under the construct of
mutually assured destruction. (Spaniel, 2015) Reference Table 2.8 for the game of
Chicken using the ACE taxonomy.
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Table 2.8. Chicken

Player Two Strategies
Chicken
Continue

Swerve

Continue

-10, -10

2, -2

Swerve

-2, 2

0, 0

Player One Strategies

Counterintuitively, increasing the cost of conflict improves the overall payoff for
an agent within the Chicken game when playing the mixed strategy. However, throwing
the cost of conflict disproportionately out of balance significantly increases the chance
the agents play the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium deleterious to the respective agent.
Exogenous control accounts for the cost of conflict in the game of Chicken (highcost Hawk-Dove) where each agent makes a binary choice between conflict and peace. In
a game where agents may choose a private commitment of resources to some conflict
(i.e., a cost known only to the respective agent), Maynard Smith discovered the
evolutionarily stable strategy of generating an exponential distribution using the value of
the prize of the conflict as the beta parameter and randomly drawing from that
distribution to determine the acceptable value of the cost of the commitment to conflict.
Given that the expected value of the cost of the conflict equals the value of the prize of
the conflict, the expected overall utility for such a stable approach equals zero. Therefore,
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Smith suggested the use of some credible mechanism for correlated equilibrium to
improve the utility for both agents; he later learned certain animals use the ownership
principle as that mechanism. (Web of Stories – Life Stories of Remarkable People, 2017)
2.5 Spacepower Applications
2.5.1 Space Debris and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The development of space power offers each nation the opportunity to bolster its
technical acumen, national prestige, and instruments of war. Among the many facets of
space power, direct ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) weapons offer an instructive case
study on the generation of space debris. Perhaps the four most pertinent events related to
DA-ASAT weapons and space debris include the 1985 destruction of the US P78-1
Solwind satellite, using an air-launched ASM-135 (during the era of the Strategic
Defense Initiative), the 2007 destruction of the Chinese FY-1C (Fengyun, “Wind and
Cloud”) satellite using a ground-launched SC-19, the 2008 destruction of the US USA193 satellite using a sea-launched Standard Missile-3 (Operation Burnt Frost), (Grego,
2012) and the 2019 destruction of the Indian Microsat-R satellite using a groundlaunched Prithvi Defense Vehicle Mark-II (Mission Shakti, “Power”). (Tellis, 2019) All
four of these satellites experienced destruction at the hands of their owners, and each
event caused significant orbital debris. Notably, however, the US and India conducted
their tests in such a manner as to deorbit all the debris within several years and much of
the debris within the first several weeks and months. In contrast, China’s demonstration
contributed to the formation of a perpetual low-earth orbit Kessler field.
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Beyond DA-ASAT weapons, many other space activities and events contributed
to the debris cloud in space. Spacefaring nations often leave spent rocket bodies and
nonfunctional spacecraft in orbit, finding such an approach more economical than
returning the artificial satellites to Earth. Many of these objects undergo physical
explosions (e.g., explosions caused by the pressure buildup in the fuel lines) or chemical
explosions (e.g., a hypergolic ignition of residual propellants, an explosion caused by
severely decayed batteries, or the purposeful self-destruction of Soviet Union satellites)
that further contribute to space debris pollution. Satellites often face the threat of
conjunction (i.e., accidental, hypervelocity, destructive collision); the 2009 Cosmos 2251
and Iridium 33 collision provides the most destructive, polluting example. (Linville &
Bettinger, 2020) The Soviet Union contributed to the space debris field with spacecraft
that leaked sodium-potassium droplets (meant to cool the nuclear reactor onboard the
respective satellite) into orbit. (The European Space Agency, n.d.)
In each of the aforementioned scenarios, the agents involved chose an action to
maximize individual utility to the detriment (directly or indirectly) of the space
community as a whole. During the era of the US and Soviet Union bipolar
dichotomization of power, such events functioned within the context of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. With a larger and growing community of modern spacefaring entities (to
include the US, Russia, China, the European Space Agency, Japan, India, South Korea,
North Korea, Iran, and Israel), the current space debris events occur in the framework of
a Tragedy of the Commons. (NASIC Public Affairs Office, 2018) While nations utilize
the more egregious events as political weapons within the international community, no
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mechanism exists to definitively prevent the creation of space debris. The 1967 Outer
Space Treaty prohibits the privatization of space, and no top-down organization currently
wields the power necessary to impose and enforce space debris regulations on the
collective group of spacefaring nations. (US Department of State, 1967) The factors that
would contribute to the effective formation of bottom-up institutions capable of
addressing the space debris issue simply do not exist. The innovation of technologies
capable of addressing the space debris problem (e.g., reusable rocket bodies, mechanical
space debris collection devices, or lasers used to deorbit space debris) afford a
worthwhile goal. The political efforts to prevent the proliferation of harmful space debris
also provide an avenue for potential progress. However, the core characteristics of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma ACE and the associated game-theoretic models suggest the
inevitability of an increasingly polluted space. Therefore, the main thrust of the US
efforts in this field should be in the development of spacecraft capable of surviving and
operating in such an environment—not in the attempt to prevent the formation of such an
environment. Increasing the resiliency of spacecraft to hypervelocity impacts, using
simpler, cost-effective replaceable spacecraft, disaggregating satellite constellation
architectures, or transitioning to less-polluted orbital regimes all provide potential
avenues for such an undertaking. In a polluted yet still usable space environment,
spacecraft maneuver also provides a mechanism for survivability. However, the finite
fuel onboard a satellite mandates the prudent use of any such maneuver. To ensure
spacecraft maneuvers are conducted judiciously and effectively, the US requires a robust
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array of space domain awareness capabilities, including both ground-based and spacebased sensors and processors.
2.5.2 Department of Defense Policy and Deadlock.
Deadlock illustrates the self-imposed damage of unforced errors by one or more
agents. A plethora of policies, some worthy of several research papers, guide the
personnel and technological development of the Department of Defense, including the
US Space Force. Any of these policies that inadvertently cause a substantive number of
talented people to exit the US military might be considered an unforced error.
Furthermore, policies that neglect the development of critical technologies (e.g., cyber)
might be considered unforced errors. When agents do not understand the implications of
their actions or hold some other goal as a higher priority, they may fail to reach the stable
equilibrium within the Deadlock ACE.
2.5.3 Conjunction, Collision, or Rendezvous and Proximity Operations.
The Pure Coordination ACE covers mutually desirable rendezvous and proximity
operations in space, such as the docking of a supply vessel to the International Space
Station. While the orbital dynamics and control theory of such an endeavor present a
technological hurdle, the game-theoretic considerations are quite simple and require only
sound communication. The Matching Pennies ACE addresses situations in which one
agent desires the proximate interaction and the other agent desires the opposite. In a
pertinent situation concerning the optimal pursuit of a spacecraft by a piece of space
debris, David Spendel relied on the field of Differential Game Theory – specifically, the
Homicidal Chauffer game-theoretic model. (Spendel, 2018)
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2.5.4 Space Resource Harvesting and the Stag Hunt.
The nascent field of space resource harvesting holds tremendous potential. Lunar
extraction may yield nuclear fusion fuel and rare earth metals with important
technological and industrial uses on Earth. Near-earth object chondrites and achondrites
may yield valuable resources for in situ utilization by manned missions or high-value
precious metals. (Duke, n.d.) Given the Stag Hunt ACE framework, synergistic
cooperation in the harvesting of these resources may occur naturally. In cases where there
are barriers to such cooperation, an agent (acting as a game designer) may use gametheoretic system design to exogenously change the structure of the game. The agent
translates the strategic form game to an extensive form information set and adds a new
branch on the previous node. This new course of action strikes a balance in individual
utility between synergistic cooperation and the preexisting choice to not cooperate. The
respective agent will never use this new branch so long as the other agent demonstrates
forward induction through the a priori commitment to synergistic cooperation. Perhaps
counterintuitively, the more developed an entity’s capacity for previous space resource
harvesting, the greater trust other agents will place in that entity’s commitment to
cooperation. Therefore, early US investment in space resource harvesting may incur a
beneficial positive feedback cycle.
2.5.5 Stoplight and Correlated Equilibrium.
The Stoplight ACE encompasses the Stoplight, Volunteer’s Dilemma, and Battle
of the Sexes game-theoretic models. The respective space analogs of these models are
cooperative maneuvering to avoid a collision, international policing in space, and
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harvesting space resources in one of two locations where the utility payoff for each agent
is different based on the location. Correlated equilibrium provides a natural and
beneficial heuristic solution for the challenges posed in this ACE. The type of mechanism
used for correlated equilibrium (e.g., memorandum of understanding alternating decision
power or an international third party) is immaterial as long as all players view the
mechanism as fair and effective.
2.5.6 Chicken as High-Cost Conflict or Intimidation.
The Chicken ACE manifests itself as a high-cost Hawk-Dove game-theoretic
model. The space analog presents itself in one of two ways: two spacefaring entities with
spacecraft on a collision course where neither will maneuver or the impending large-scale
conflict between two nations encompassing the space domain. There are several gametheoretic system design approaches capable of addressing the Chicken ACE. Similar to
the Stag Hunt, a game designer may exogenously translate the game into extensive form
and add a branch to the previous node. This new branch acts as a commitment
mechanism that turns an incredible threat into a credible threat (much like the concept of
burning bridges). The commitment mechanism may exist in a technological form (a
doomsday device serves as a sensational example) or in a diplomatic-political form (such
as the use of a “red line”). The strength of this approach rests in the strength of the
commitment mechanism; for example, if other agents do not believe in the credibility of a
player’s red line, the approach will falter. To preserve credibility, red lines must be
enforced even when doing so seems impractical since a failed red-line strategy will
impact an agent’s credibility in any future game against a player with knowledge of the
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unenforced red line. If a player is unwilling to follow through with the red-line threat, the
player should consider not making the red-line threat in the first place.
Another game-theoretic system design approach drives the hypothetical mutual
cost of conflict so high that the comparative statics indicate that the two agents would
never enter into such a conflict. Quintessentially, the space-contextual application for
such an approach would be the commitment by two or more nations to disregard the
Outer Space Treaty and commit to the use of nuclear weapons in space should a conflict
ever occur.
A final game-theoretic system design approach encompasses an agent that reduces
the individual cost of conflict or collision. If the two agents play the mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, this approach will work to the detriment of the agent using this method.
However, this approach improves the probability that the two agents will transition to the
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium favorable to the player that used this taxonomy. In the
space domain, a nation might enact this approach by developing lower-cost, less reliable,
and less exquisite spacecraft, which the nation can affordably replenish in the event of a
collision or malfunction.
2.6 Conclusion
This article asserted that decision-makers could use game-theoretic system design
to understand space power challenges and opportunities better, as well as achieve better
outcomes for the US space enterprise. In support of this thesis, we contextualized the
spectrum of agent strategic interactions, proposed a new taxonomy for the classification
of game-theoretic models, and expounded the proposed taxonomy, using eight atomic
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game structures with pertinent space applications. In this effort, we strive for the
advancement of strategic thinking in the space domain for the enhancement of the US
space security posture.
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Chapter 3: Aggregated Space Combat Modeling
3.1 Abstract
The use of aggregated combat modeling in the cislunar environment has been
demonstrated to inform acquisition decisions for the United States Space Force (USSF).
First, the cislunar space is hypothesized as a future strategic conflict environment. As
such, Lanchester, Lotka-Volterra, and Brackney models could be appropriate to describe
such conflict. All models encompass a system of differential equations which
parametrically capture the dynamics between friendly and hostile forces. While the
Brackney model was constructed to explain two-dimensional land battle, this article
adapts it for the respective three-dimensional space domain and applies it to strategic
procurement. The analysis demonstrates the preeminence of Space Domain Awareness
(SDA) in certain contexts while recognizing conditions in which spacecraft survivability
holds greater importance.
3.2 Introduction
Combat modeling holds meaningful potential for the nascent United States Space
Force (USSF). While disparate schools of thought concerning the best approaches are
developing, the judicious use of multiple models will enable decision makers to thrive in
the multifaceted, competitive space environment. Washburn asserts, “Combat models are
sometimes described as ‘aggregated’ or ‘high resolution,’ but aggregation should really
be measured on a continuous scale… To the extent that dissimilar things are treated as if
they were identical, the model is said to be more or less aggregated.” (Washburn &
Kress, 2009) In addition to existing along a continuum, aggregation is also multi-
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dimensional in that the level of aggregation must be considered for time, space, and the
attributes of the objects within the model. Whereas high-fidelity, physics-based models
such as Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling (AFSIM) and
Systems Tool Kit (STK) may be used to predict tactical outcomes, aggregated models
provide a level of abstraction more appropriate for strategic insight. Using aggregated
combat models, an opportunity exists to understand complex interactions and anticipate
the strategic outcomes of space conflicts and make effective procurement decisions
accordingly. To bolster this hypothesis, this article:


Characterizes a potential future conflict environment



Presents and explains certain landmark aggregated combat models



Demonstrates the use of an aggregated combat model in strategic
procurement

The United States (US) and China acknowledge the strategic importance of the
space domain, including the Moon, by investing significant financial and political
resources into the Artemis (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2020) and
Chang’e (Myers & Chang, 2020) programs, respectively. While a multitude of factors
contribute to the strategic significance of the Moon, space resources provide one potential
impetus for lunar security. Section 10 of the Artemis Accords formally demonstrates the
international commitment to the “extraction and utilization of space resources… from the
surface or subsurface of the Moon, Mars, comets, or asteroids.” (National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, 2020) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) recognizes that China controls 90% of the production of Rare Earth Metals
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(REM) and that the US might one day harvest these resources from the Moon. The set of
resources includes: Scandium, Yttrium, Lanthanum, Cerium, Praseodymium,
Neodymium, Promethium, Samarium, Europium, Gadolinium, Terbium, Dysprosium,
Holmium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, and Lutetium. The Moon may also offer a
supply of Helium-3 which, when processed with Deuterium, can yield Helium-4. Helium4 could potentially be safely contained within an electromagnetic field and provide a
consistent supply of energy. Spacefaring entities could potentially harvest water from the
Moon for life support, agriculture, radiation shielding, and the production of rocket fuel.
(911Metallurgist, 2015) Beyond lunar extraction, the Moon offers a potential staging area
for asteroid mining – either as a waypoint or as a parking orbit for mining asteroids.
Chondrite asteroids may contain water and achondrite asteroids may contain both
precious and industrial metals. (Glester, 2018)
The lunar environment provides a natural fit for aggregated combat modeling
because of the relative homogeneity of its natural environment and its future potential
force composition. Whereas the Earth presents an atmosphere with a fluctuating density
(Earth’s atmospheric density fluctuates with respect to time according to the solar cycle
(Walterscheid, 1989) and decreases with increasing altitude for a specific time) well past
1,000 kilometers (km), the Moon presents no meaningful atmosphere with respect to
spacecraft maneuvers. (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2020) The Earth
also holds a relatively strong electromagnetic field with non-monotonic levels of
radiation. The outer Van Allen radiation belt extends beyond geostationary (GEO) orbit.
By contrast, the weak magnetic field of the Moon enables spacecraft in lunar orbit to
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experience cosmic and solar radiation relatively independent of lunar altitude. The
Moon’s weaker gravitational field causes lower orbital velocities and affords spacecraft
greater maneuverability. (Sellers, 2005) Lastly, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and GEO pose
concentrations of spacecraft and space debris ripe for the formation of Kessler fields;
cislunar space from Lagrange 1 (L1) to L2 does not yet pose such a threat. (The European
Space Agency, n.d.)
The destructions of several spacecraft (P78-1, FY-1C, USA-193, (Grego, 2012)
and Microsat-R) (Tellis, 2019) using Direct Ascent Antisatellite (DA-ASAT) weapons
demonstrate the practical utility in using Earth-based sensors and weapons to achieve
kinetic kills on LEO targets. This tight integration between ground and space forces
creates a heterogeneous force composition not ideally suited for aggregated models. The
distance from Earth to the cislunar environment (L1 to L2) precludes the efficient use of
one-to-one DA-ASAT weapons and encourages the future bulk deployment of spacecraft
to the cislunar environment. Such deployments potentially constitute relatively
homogenous forces appropriate for aggregated modeling. The characterization of this
potential conflict environment serves to justify the use of the aggregated combat models
and establish a basis for parameter values for the strategic procurement analysis.
3.3 Literature Review
While fractionation of belligerent parties characterized certain ancient warfare
and modern internecine strife, dichotomization largely characterizes large-scale modern
conflict including the formation of unnatural alliances. To that end, this article considers
systems of two differential equations.
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The effects of nominally negative events, when delivered in proper amount, may
produce a net positive result such as shown in several biological processes - eustress,
osteogenic loading, or hormesis. For example, a little stress on humans results in
cognitive and mental performance gains. Examples extend beyond biology into the
sphere of geopolitical and military power. The United States underwent decay in
strategic and conventional warfighting capabilities when it embodied the sole global
superpower and focused on counterinsurgency operations (c. 1991 – 2016). Presented
with near-peer adversaries, the United States again sharpened its technical acumen and
focused its efforts on strategic and conventional warfighting capabilities. (O'Rourke,
2020) Many acknowledge the role that levels of adversity and the shape of the growthadversity curve play in warfighting. In a time of intense conflict, near-peer adversaries
will move each other into the fragility-zone, wherein greater adversity produces greater
loss. Reference Figure 3.1 for non-monotonic notional growth-adversity curve.
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Figure 3.1. Notional Growth-Adversity Curve
The relationship of two entities may be characterized based on their effect on each
other. Reference Figure 3.2 for characterization of relationships based on interaction
effects.
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Figure 3.2. Characterizing Relationships Based on Interaction Effects
The characteristics of near-peer space conflict suggest a deleterious-deleterious
relationship. The Lanchester, Lotka-Volterra, and Brackney models constitute the most
significant, historical aggregated combat models developed from the beginning of the
twentieth century.
Lanchester published his models in the book Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of
the Fourth Arm against the backdrop of World War I to describe force attrition during
aerial warfare. The Lanchester Linear Law for unaimed fire describes the attrition of red
and blue forces under simplified engagement assumptions; it may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
= −𝑟𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑅
= −𝑏𝐵𝑅
𝑑𝑡
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such that
𝑟 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑏 ~ 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐵 ~ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝑅 ~ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
This states that the attrition rate for both red and blue is a function of the size of both
forces. In this case, the fighting strength of each force may be presented as
𝐹𝐵 = 𝑏𝐵
𝐹𝑅 = 𝑟𝑅
The Lanchester Square Law for aimed fire may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
= −𝑟𝑅
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑅
= −𝑏𝐵
𝑑𝑡
Here, the red (blue) attrition rate is a function of the blue’s (red’s) force size. The
fighting strength of each force for the Square Law is presented as
𝐹𝐵 = 𝑏𝐵2
𝐹𝑅 = 𝑟𝑅2
For both Lanchester laws, the force with the greater fighting strength will win the
conflict. Both laws depend on the homogeneity of units on either side of the conflict and
assume a generally uniform distribution of fire from one side against the other. The
equations do not account for superior tactics unless such tactics are captured in the
attrition coefficients. (Lanchester, 1916) Conventionally, attrition coefficients for the
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Lanchester Laws are determined empirically. Predictive values for attrition coefficients
concerning future conflicts which are determined by a group of experts will encompass a
degree of subjectivity.
Bonder attempted to overcome the need for homogeneity in the Lanchester laws
by establishing a more generalized form for the coupled sets of differential equations
which may be presented as
𝑁

𝑑𝐵𝑚
= − ∑ 𝑟𝑚,𝑛 𝑅𝑛
𝑑𝑡

𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀

𝑛=1
𝑀

𝑑𝑅𝑛
= − ∑ 𝑏𝑚,𝑛 𝐵𝑚
𝑑𝑡

𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁

𝑚=1

These equations are identical to the Lanchester Square Law except that the cumulative
effects of the constituent parts of the heterogeneous forces are accounted for using the
attrition coefficients within the pairwise relationships between the opposing forces.
Bonder also developed quantitative processes for predicting specific attrition coefficients
based on weapons systems efficacy against live and dead targets as well as the allocation
procedure in assigning weapons to targets; to a lesser extent, Bonder also examined the
effects of varied terrain. Bonder admitted that many of the parametric inputs for
determining specific attrition coefficients could not be effectively predicted. The
difficulty in establishing accurate predictions for the Bonder parameters affirms a
potential strength in the simplicity of the Lanchester equations which might provide
satisfactory approximations while describing mean results. (Bonder & Farrell, 1970)
Out of a keen interest in Biomathematics, Lotka and Volterra independently
developed their ideas on predator-prey interactions and interspecific competition during
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the 1920s. While their works have stood as a cornerstone of theoretical ecology, the ideas
therein were also contextualized to the domain of warfare. (Kingsland, 2015) The
Competitive Lotka-Volterra Equations, modeling interspecific competition, has been
modeled as
𝑑𝑁1
𝐾1 − 𝑁1 − 𝛼𝑁2
= 𝑟1 𝑁1 (
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾1
𝑑𝑁2
𝐾2 − 𝑁2 − 𝛽𝑁1
= 𝑟2 𝑁2 (
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾2
where
𝑟 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑁 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐾 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝛼 ~ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 2 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 1
𝛽 ~ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 2
These equations assume a mutually deleterious relationship between two entities and are
generally used for modeling competition between two biological species.
If warfighting entities encompass certain characteristics of interspecific
competition such as a carrying capacity, logistic growth, and competition over common
resources, the Lanchester-Lotka-Volterra Hybrid Model may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
𝐾𝐵 − 𝐵 − 𝑟𝑅
= 𝐵(
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾𝐵
𝑑𝑅
𝐾𝑅 − 𝑅 − 𝑏𝐵
= 𝑅(
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾𝑅
where
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𝐾 is still carrying (fighting) capacity of both entities
𝛼 and 𝛽 have been replaced with attrition rates of both entities, 𝑟 and 𝑏, and
𝑅 and 𝐵 are force size.
In the transition from the Lanchester Equations to the Hybrid Equations, the goal
of conflict shifts from direct attrition to the establishment of a dominant isocline.
Fundamentally, there exist four isocline scenarios which determine the fate of the
conflict. In the case of the dominant blue isocline, the following inequalities hold:
𝐾𝐵 >

𝐾𝑅
𝑏

𝐾𝐵
> 𝐾𝑅
𝑟
The blue force will eliminate the red force and grow to its natural carrying capacity.
Likewise, dominant red isocline occurs when:
𝐾𝑅 >

𝐾𝐵
𝑟

𝐾𝑅
> 𝐾𝐵
𝑏
The red force will eliminate the blue force and grow to its natural carrying capacity.
Interestingly, the isoclines present divergent bifurcation when
𝐾𝐵 >

𝐾𝑅
𝑏

𝐾𝑅 >

𝐾𝐵
𝑟

In this case, the outcome of the conflict hinges on the parameter values of the respective
carrying capacities and attrition coefficients as well as the initial size of each belligerent
force. Lastly, the isoclines present convergent behavior when
45

𝐾𝐵
> 𝐾𝑅
𝑟
𝐾𝑅
> 𝐾𝐵
𝑏
and the size of each force will converge to a steady equilibrium. (Olson, 2014)
Brackney published his work “The Dynamics of Military Combat” in 1959
against the backdrop of the Cold War. His article sought mathematical grounding for
established combat principles and proposed a model which decomposed attrition
coefficients into discoverable physical phenomena. (Brackney, 1959) The Brackney
Equations may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
𝑅𝐵𝑆𝑅
=−
𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝐵 𝐵𝑆𝑅 + 𝑉𝐵
𝑑𝑅
𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐵
=−
𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝑅 𝑅𝑆𝐵 + 𝑉𝑅
such that
𝑆𝐵 ~ 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑉𝐵 ~ 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑦
𝑇𝐵 ~ 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
The Brackney Equations do not present tractable expressions for fighting effectiveness.
According to Washburn and Kress, (Washburn & Kress, 2009) these equations act like
the Lanchester Linear Law when the B and R force sizes are large. In this case, attrition
is limited by the time for destruction, T. Alternatively, these equations act like the
Lanchester Square Law when B and R are small; attrition is instead limited by the time
for search. The Brackney Equations still assume a random uniform distribution of each
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force throughout its respective volume. A distinct advantage of the Brackney approach is
that the parameter values may be determined objectively and quantitatively from
concrete, discoverable phenomena. In observing the operational envelope, time-to-kill,
and search rate of a single blue and red unit, the parameters related to both forces may be
discovered. Therefore, policymakers could use the Brackney Equations in a forwardlooking manner to make military procurement decisions.
3.4 Methodology
This section discusses a method for strategic procurement analysis using the
Brackney Equations and establishes pertinent parameter values. Python 3.7 implemented
in a Spyder integrated development environment (IDE) provides the computational
backbone for this analysis.
The distance from the center of the Moon to the Moon’s first Lagrange point L1 is
approximately 61,350 km (Maccone, 2002) and the distance to the gravitational
equilibrium point (EP) between the Earth and the Moon is approximately 47,934 km. As
such, a conservative estimate for modeling the envelope of conflict might be
approximated as extending from the lunar surface to a semimajor axis considerably lower
than the EP distance. The volume of conflict is calculated as
4
3
𝑉 = ( ) 𝜋(𝑎3 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑛
)
3
such that (Pisacane, 2016)
𝑎 ~ 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑠
𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑛 ~ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑛 = 1737.1 𝑘𝑚
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This analysis assumes a finite number of opposing spacecraft occupy the same
volumetric space distributed uniformly. This analysis assumes the mutual use of directed
energy weapons (DEW) which do not generate additional debris. The sensors on each
spacecraft are idealized as omnidirectional enabling an awareness sphere. The search rate
is approximated as the amount of volume within the sphere per second. The search
volume per second is presented as
4
3
𝑆 = ( ) 𝜋𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟
3
such that
𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 ~ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟
This research is meant to afford decision makers a forward-looking mechanism to
improve strategic posture. Many of the technologies associated with this scenario exist at
a low technology readiness level (TRL), and/or are not yet deployed en masse. As such,
any parameter values concerning number of spacecraft, time-to-kill, or sensor range are
purely notional and only for demonstration purposes. The value of this method exists in
integrating the strategic models for use in space.
3.5 Analysis
This analysis provides an example of a simple strategic procurement decision and
models a conflict which lasts one week (604,800 seconds (s)). In a theoretical contest
between two belligerent forces with technical and force parity such that
𝑎 = 5000 𝑘𝑚, semimajor axis
𝑟𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 20 𝑘𝑚, max effective sensor range
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𝑇𝐵 = 𝑇𝑅 = 100 𝑠, destruction time
𝐵 = 𝑅 = 100, force size
each side will fight to a draw. Figure 3.3 shows the results of this baseline conflict.

Figure 3.3. Baseline Conflict Results
However, prior to the conflict, the blue force is afforded the opportunity to upgrade one
aspect of its space force by 50%. The options are:
a) increase 𝑟𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 30 𝑘𝑚,
b) increase destruction time 𝑇𝐵 = 150 𝑠, a proxy for improving survivability, or
c) increase constellation size 𝐵 = 150.
Using the Brackney Model, decision makers determine that the 𝑇𝐵 = 150 𝑠 upgrade
makes a negligible difference. The 𝐵 = 150 upgrade significantly improves the outcome
of the conflict, shown in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4. Conflict Results After B = 150 Upgrade
The 𝑟𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 30 𝑘𝑚 upgrade provides an overwhelming advantage to the blue
force. Figure 3.5 shows the results of this upgrade.

Figure 3.5. Conflict Results After r (Blue Sensor) = 30 km Upgrade
Equipped with this knowledge, blue decision makers choose the sensor upgrade to
achieve the greatest improvement in strategic posture. Table 3.1 shows the sensitivity
analysis for the various upgrades.
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Table 3.1. Upgrade Results Sensitivity Analysis

The analysis of this theoretical contest placed a premium on space domain
awareness (SDA) and afforded little value to spacecraft survivability because of the
vastness of the volume of space in relation to the sensor capabilities and number of
spacecraft. Attrition was search-limited from the onset of the conflict. Importantly,
different parameter values will yield different results. As more units crowd the
battlespace, the sensor capability significance diminishes while survivability grows more
important. However, for this volume of conflict, four orders of magnitude in force size
would be required for time-to-kill to overtake sensor range in importance.
The Brackney Model sometimes produces interesting results wherein the
numerical advantage shifts back and forth between the two forces. In a hypothetical
contest using 𝐵 = 1200, 𝑅 = 1000, 𝑟𝐵𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 30 𝑘𝑚, 𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 = 20 𝑘𝑚, 𝑇𝐵 =
1000 𝑠, and 𝑇𝑅 = 27500 𝑠, blue will begin in the lead, then lag behind numerically, and
eventually win the conflict. Reference Figure 3.6 to see the results of this conflict.
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Figure 3.6. Shifting from Time-to-Kill Dominated to Search Dominated Conflict
Historical analogs for this type of conflict exist. A numerically inferior but higher quality
force invades a country and defeats massed conventional forces. The defeated force
transitions the conflict into an insurgency phase. Though the insurgent force is
outnumbered by superior forces, the insurgent force search time is better than the search
time of the occupying force. The insurgent force eventually defeats or expels the
occupying force. The Brackney Equations are a useful tool for strategic thinking and can
be leveraged when making procurement decisions for the USSF.
3.6 Conclusion
We asserted that decision makers could use aggregated modeling to inform
procurement strategy in the development of the USSF. In support of this thesis, a
potential future conflict environment was suggested, certain aggregated combat models
were described, and the use of Brackney Equations was demonstrated. In doing so, we
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endeavor for the advancement of strategic thinking and modeling to enhance US space
power.
Future work will include the integration of game theoretic models to inform the
parameters of the aggregated combat models. Aggregated simulation results could be
validated by high-fidelity models. Aggregated simulation results may also serve as a
performance baseline when evaluating tactical outcomes in high-fidelity environments.
This methodology could be integrated into the procurement process of the appropriate
System Program Office (SPO) for the enhancement of US space power.
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Chapter 4: Survival Analysis for Nanosatellites and Picosatellites
4.1 Abstract
The nascent field of fractionated satellite architectures provides an opportunity to
improve spacecraft modularity and afford greater flexibility, adaptability, and
upgradeability to spacecraft constellations. Satellite modules within a coherent formation
can be replaced without facing the challenges of manufacturing, assembly, or
disassembly in the harsh space environment (e.g., satellite modules conducting
electromagnetic formation flight (EMFF) are not physically connected such that one
module may be replaced with potentially less risk of damaging or degrading the
performance of the other modules). Conventionally, the depot for constellation
replenishment is located on Earth, however, minor augmentations to spacecraft
formations cannot be conducted economically under such a framework. The present
research proposes the utilization of proactively launched supply depots to replenish
geostationary formations from ultrageostationary orbit (i.e., that volume of space
encompassed between the altitude of geostationary orbit and the altitude of the L1
Lagrange point). This work explores reliability factors associated with such a concept by
conducting a survival analysis for nanosatellites and picosatellites. Time to failure data is
collected for 85 spacecraft in the nano- (1.01 – 10 kg wet mass) and pico- (0.11 – 1 kg
wet mass) classes without data censoring. These spacecraft were launched between 2010
and 2019, inclusive, having an internationally diverse set of owners from the sectors of
military, government, commercial, and academia. This data is used to build a distribution
for the survival analysis of satellites in these classes. JMP Pro 13 is used to conduct a
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goodness-of-fit test for multiple distributions. Analysis (using a standard alpha value of
0.05) indicates that the data is from a two-parameter Weibull distribution wherein the
spacecraft experience beneficial aging.
4.2 Introduction
The U.S. Air Force 2030 Science and Technology Strategy characterizes five
transformational strategic capabilities as integral to the airpower and spacepower of the
U.S. including (U.S. Air Force, 2019):
•

global persistent awareness

•

resilient information sharing

•

rapid, effective decision-making

•

complexity, unpredictability, and mass

•

speed and reach of disruption and lethality

The strategy explicitly ties “global persistent awareness” to the technological opportunity
of “small satellites and low-cost launch.” The strategy also explicitly ties “complexity,
unpredictability, and mass” to the technological opportunity of “low-cost air and space
platforms.” These national security technological opportunities provided an impetus for
the development of the Kinetically-Aggregated Infrastructure Revitalization of Spacecraft
(KAIROS) concept. KAIROS exists as the replenishment or enhancement of a
fractionated spacecraft by a supply depot also located in space. (Hayhurst, Bettinger, &
Grandhi, 2021) This current work focuses on the reliability aspects of KAIROS.
In understanding the KAIROS concept, one may consider a simplified use case
wherein several spheres flying in formation along the geostationary belt constitute the
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functional capability of a communications satellite. Approximately homogeneous in
mass, these spheres present inertia tensors with no cross-coupling and equal angular
inertia values for each axis. A control moment gyroscope mounted internally on each axis
provides satellite attitude control and rings embedded along the outer shell of each sphere
surge current to create an electromagnetic field in order to generate the force necessary to
conduct intra-formation position maneuvers. The spheres can aggregate and use thrusters
to perform conventional orbital maneuvers. Power can be distributed wirelessly and
computing power can be disaggregated to the different spheres. Supply depots located at
higher altitudes in ultrageostationary orbit can send individual spheres to designated
formations for the replenishment or enhancement of a particular constellation.
Exploring the reliability factors associated with KAIROS enables an
understanding of the failure times for future operational systems. Such knowledge
improves the Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process and
affords a more accurate Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for the Future Year
Defense Program (FYDP). The subsequent improvements to acquisitions performance in
terms of cost, risk, schedule, and system capability ultimately promote the security and
prosperity of the U.S..
This article seeks to advance the national security posture of the U.S. through the
presentation of research on the reliability factors of an advanced technology conceptual
framework. Motivation for the research is contextualized to the acquisitions processes
within the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Space Force (USSF). Descriptive statistics
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and data collection of the reliability of 85 satellites is discussed. Finally, analysis and
distribution building for the time to failure of these spacecraft is conducted.
4.3 Literature Review
Kong et al. proposed the use of electromagnetic formation flight (EMFF) as a
propellant-free alternative to satellite formation flight. (Kong, et al., 2004) Hilton,
(Hilton, 2015) Alvisio, (Alvisio, 2015) and many others of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) Space Systems Laboratory (SSL) advanced EMFF technology with
their work on the Synchronized Position Hold Engage and Reorient Experimental
Satellites Resonant Inductive Near-field Generation System (SPHERES-RINGS). The
reconstitution of an operational version of such a fractionated spacecraft by a supply
depot in space provides an excellent example of the KAIROS concept.
Saleh discussed the application of the Weibull distribution (a more generalized
form of the exponential distribution) to spacecraft reliability. (Saleh & Castet, 2010) The
U.S. Air Force discussed the potential benefit of using disaggregation to improve the
resiliency of spacecraft architectures. (Air Force Space Command, 2016) Cristini,
(Cristini, 2010) Mathieu, (Mathieu & Weigel, 2005) Daniels, (Daniels & Pate-Cornell,
2015) and Brown (Brown & Eremenko, 2008) also discussed the benefits of fractionated
satellite architectures.
4.4 Analysis
Convenience sampling was used to collect time to failure data for 85 spacecraft in
the nano- (1.01 – 10 kg wet mass) and pico- (0.11 – 1 kg wet mass) classes with no
censoring. Consistent with an ultraquality framework, reliability was considered only at
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the system level. (Maier & Eberhardt, 2009) These spacecraft were launched between
2010 and 2019, inclusive, having an internationally diverse set of owners from the sectors
of military, government, commercial, and academia. These 85 spacecraft had a mean
survival time of 0.513 years (median survival time of 0.186 years) with a standard
deviation of 0.961 years and range of 0.003 years to 7.351 years. The failure times for the
satellites are plotted in Figure 4.1. These failure times were used to build a distribution
for the survival analysis of satellites in these classes.

Figure 4.1. Satellite Failure Times
The time to failure data in Figure 4.1 was used to find a probability distribution
that could be used to model spacecraft survivability (time until system failure).
Spacecraft reliability is sometimes modeled with the exponential distribution, however,
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the exponential distribution is known to have a memoryless property, which, in this
application, would imply that failure at any given time is not dependent on how long the
spacecraft has survived already. This is a property in contrast to the beneficial aging that
is theorized for this set of satellites. Therefore, two different reliability distributions were
considered to model the time until failure: the exponential distribution due to its common
application and potential usefulness given the shape of the distribution in Figure 1 and the
Weibull distribution which is related to the exponential distribution through a transform
of the exponentially distributed random variable yet does not maintain the memoryless
property of the exponential distribution (and thus, may better fit the concept of beneficial
aging). Specifically, let the time to failure be denoted as random variable X. Then, the
exponential distribution for X is expressed as:
−

𝑥

𝑒 𝛽
𝑓 (𝑥 ) =
𝛽
with the support of x ranging from zero to infinity. The Weibull distribution is related to
the exponential distribution through the random variable transformation:
𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙 =

1
𝛾
𝑋𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙

to yield a Weibull-distributed random variable Z whose probability density is defined as:

𝑓 (𝑧 ) =

𝑒

𝑧𝛾
−
𝛽

𝛽

𝛾𝑧 𝛾−1

and whose support ranges from zero to infinity. 𝛽 is the scale parameter (characteristic
life span) while 𝛾 is the shape parameter.
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The Weibull distribution accounts for beneficial or deleterious aging, through its
additional parameter, 𝛾, in which 𝛾 < 1 indicates beneficial aging and 𝛾 > 1 indicates
deleterious aging. To determine the best distribution for this satellite data, JMP Pro 13
was used to conduct goodness-of-fit testing for both the exponential and Weibull
distributions. The Cramer-von Mises W goodness-of-fit test and the Kolmogorov’s D
goodness-of-fit test were used to formally determine whether or not the Weibull and
exponential distributions fit the data, respectively. The Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) goodness-of-fit for the likelihoods of both the exponential and Weibull distribution
were compared. Formal statistical testing was conducted using a standard alpha value of
0.05.
Figure 4.2 shows the cumulative distribution function for spacecraft failure with
the aforementioned fitted exponential and includes a 95% confidence interval. Ideally, if
the data was exponentially distributed, it would follow along the solid line and lie within
the 95% confidence bounds. The time to failure data does not follow the expected
probability well in Figure 4.2 and via formal testing, failed the Kolmogorov’s D
goodness-of-fit test, indicating that the data was not from an exponential distribution.
Specifically, this test yielded a Kolmogorov’s D of 0.250270 and a p-value of 0.01. The
AIC value for the best fitting exponential distribution was 58.514460.
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Figure 4.2. Probability of Failure vs. Time to Failure with Fitted Exponential Distribution
The Cramer-von Mises W goodness-of-fit test for a fitted Weibull yielded a
Cramer-von Mises W of 0.103840 and a p-value of 0.0907 indicating that the Weibull
distribution may be an adequate fit for the data. Fitting the two-parameter Weibull
yielded parameter estimates of 𝛽 = 0.3306607 and 𝛾 = 0.5922925 which indicates
beneficial aging – the expected result in spacecraft reliability. The 95% confidence
intervals for these parameter estimates are as follows:
0.2240266 ≤ β ≤ 0.4820571
0.4987221 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 0.693607
The AIC value for this best fitting Weibull was 8.831280, indicating a better fit
for the Weibull distribution than the exponential distribution (lower AIC value is better).
Figure 4.3 shows the cumulative distribution function for spacecraft failure with
the aforementioned fitted Weibull. Figure 3 also encompasses a 95% confidence interval
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for the Weibull distribution. In general, the data better fits the Weibull distribution as
shown in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3. Probability of Failure vs. Time to Failure with Fitted Weibull Distribution
4.5 Conclusion
This article created a parametric distribution for a data set encompassing nanoand pico- class satellites to characterize the survival analysis of satellites in these classes.
The analysis determined a Weibull distribution parameterized to represent beneficial
aging constituted a representation of the data which was both accurate and tractable.
Understanding the reliability characteristics of satellites in these classes affords the U.S.
Department of Defense the opportunity to increase the efficacy of its acquisition
programs. Ultimately, this work strives for the enhancement of the security and
prosperity of the U.S. through the advancement of strategic thinking within the space
domain.
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Future work will integrate this knowledge into a framework which will help guide
the acquisition and operational decisions of the USSF. This future framework will
integrate parametric distributions such as those discussed in this article with game
theoretic models as well as population models including Lanchester, Lotka-Volterra, and
Brackney.
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Chapter 5: A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of Media Interaction Warfare Theory
5.1 Abstract
Understanding the efficacy of the U.S. military in the domains of land, sea, air,
and space provides valuable geopolitical insights which can help guide the policies and
actions of the United States. There exists an importance in knowing the effectiveness of
the individual elements of the land, sea, air, and space forces as well as the effectiveness
of the integrated whole. In conducting such an evaluation, parametric models may afford
timely, effective methodologies. Media Interaction Warfare Theory presents a method
germane to the field of parametric modeling and asserts the ability to enhance the space
warfare posture of the United States. This article investigates the validity of Media
Interaction Warfare Theory using the game-theoretic concepts encompassed within the
Atomic Competitive Element taxonomy. This work finds a general alignment between
the results of Media Interaction Warfare Theory modeling and game-theoretic modeling
indicating that Media Interaction Warfare Theory may be a valid tool for determining the
efficacy of a fighting force. This work provides some evidence that Media Interaction
Warfare Theory and game-theoretic methods validate each other as effective conflictmodeling methods; this work proposes the use of these parametric modeling
methodologies in the Department of Defense acquisitions processes.
5.2 Introduction
This article seeks to advance strategic thought on spacepower and enhance the
military posture of the U.S. space endeavor. To achieve this goal, this paper will examine
the use of parametric modeling in predicting the outcome of multi-domain warfare,
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especially in the context of an emerging space domain. Specifically, this work will
conduct a game theoretic evaluation of Media Interaction Warfare Theory (MIWT) with
significant focus on the penultimate (application of matrix theory) and ultimate
(calculation of determinants) steps of the MIWT methodology. First, this work presents a
literature review which discusses MIWT, game theory, and other historical frameworks
for parametric modeling. Second, the methodology of evaluation is expounded using a
notional example. Finally, an analysis is conducted on empirical and theoretical historical
examples; within this analysis MIWT is evaluated against a game-theoretic framework to
discover the presence or absence of a general alignment between the results of MIWT
and game-theoretic modeling. Ultimately, this work strives to enrich the sphere of
Department of Defense modeling and in doing so promote the peace and prosperity of the
United States.
5.3 Literature Review
Scardera and Cesul developed “Media Interaction Warfare Theory: A Novel
Analytic Process Supporting Space Warfare Planning Operations” in order to advance
and mature the thought and theory associated with space warfare. In their own words:
With the debate settled over whether space is a war-fighting domain
and whether an independent space force should be established, the
discussion now shifts toward providing analytic frameworks to
answer more strategic questions about space warfare in general.…
We describe a novel approach called the “media interaction theory
of warfare,” which provides a unique and simple way to evaluate
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different integrated force structures, offering a true joint forces
perspective to begin addressing these questions while providing a
basis for more analytic treatment…. We construct a simple model
containing interactions between different domain media. This
construct leads to a media interaction matrix mathematical model
based on linear algebra. This unique model development separates
the analysis from previous work in the area. Based on an order of
battle, an integrated force structure matrix can be built, and a
determinant taken to provide a single value for the force structure’s
relative strength. This relative strength may, in turn, be compared to
other very diverse force structures to find the dominating integrated
armed force. (Scardera & Cesul, 2021)
The nature of the various warfare domains as qualitatively unique spheres of
influence is integral to Scardera and Cesul’s framework. Scardera and Cesul sought to
articulate the qualities of the domains in and of themselves as well as their effects on
other dissimilar spheres. In their research, Scardera and Cesul relied on many of the
luminaries of military strategic studies throughout history. Principles of land warfare
were drawn from Sun Tzu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini, and B. H.
Liddell Hart. Lessons in naval warfare were taken from Philip H. Colomb, Alfred Thayer
Mahan, and Julian S. Corbett. Principles of air warfare were drawn from Hugh M.
Trenchard, Giulio Douhet, and William L. Mitchell. The common themes which Scardera
and Cesul pulled from these theorists and used to build MIWT include, “interactions
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within the media dominate … each new medium has a dominating influence over the
other media … interactions between media are important … new media greater mobility
gives an initiative advantage … offense has a proactive aspect, while defense is
retroactive … [and] a geometric or mathematical construct is possible.” (Scardera &
Cesul, 2021)
In producing a mathematical construct for parametric modeling according to
MIWT, each interaction between each domain must be captured in a matrix for a
particular force. Therefore, the size of a given matrix has an n-squared relationship to the
number of domains. A matrix which encompasses only land forces presents a one-by-one
dimensionality whereas a matrix considering all four domains presents a four-by-four
dimensionality with sixteen interactions. An MIWT four-by-four matrix encompasses
sixteen scalar values which together characterize the efficacy of a single belligerent in
conflict with an opposing belligerent. According to MIWT, the determinant of a given
matrix may be calculated to determine the effectiveness of the respective force. The
scoring mechanism used to assign a particular number to a cell within a matrix uses
scores between zero and one for supremacy conflict cells and offensive cells (i.e., those
cells on the diagonal or above the diagonal of the matrix) and uses scores between
negative one and zero for defensive cells (i.e., those cells below the diagonal of the
matrix). Within MIWT, space forces are considered the most mobile (and therefore most
offensive in nature) forces with air, sea, and land forces presenting progressively less
mobility – this assumption characterizes the nature of conflict between domains within
MIWT. The maximum potential efficacy of a fighting force grows by binary orders of
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magnitude for each new warfighting domain capability which is added to the matrix.
Table 5.1 is adapted from the work of Scardera and Cesul and presented to provide clarity
on the development of matrices within MIWT. (Scardera & Cesul, 2021) In application,
Table 5.1 would be filled in with sixteen scalar values to show the effectiveness of a
single belligerent across sixteen interactions.
Table 5.1. Understanding MIWT
Land to land
Sea to land
Air to land
supremacy efficacy offensive efficacy
offensive efficacy
score ranging from score ranging from score ranging from
zero to one
zero to one
zero to one
Land to sea
Sea to sea
Air to sea offensive
defensive efficacy supremacy efficacy
efficacy score
score ranging from score ranging from
ranging from zero
negative one to zero
zero to one
to one
Land to air
Sea to air defensive
Air to air
defensive efficacy
efficacy score
supremacy efficacy
score ranging from
ranging from
score ranging from
negative one to zero negative one to zero
zero to one
Land to space
Sea to space
Air to space
defensive efficacy
defensive efficacy
defensive efficacy
score ranging from score ranging from score ranging from
negative one to zero negative one to zero negative one to zero

Space to land
offensive efficacy
score ranging from
zero to one
Space to sea
offensive efficacy
score ranging from
zero to one
Space to air
offensive efficacy
score ranging from
zero to one
Space to space
supremacy efficacy
score ranging from
zero to one

Hayhurst and Colombi developed a taxonomy for categorizing game-theoretic
scenarios according to attributes desirable for the stability of an outcome within a game.
(Hayhurst & Colombi, Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of Space
Power, 2021) Known as the Atomic Competitive Element (ACE) taxonomy, this
construct considers agent utility balance, Nash equilibrium, and Pareto optimality in the
illustration and classification of games. Agent utility balance means that the payoff for
each player for a given outcome is the same or approximately the same within some
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margin (epsilon). A Nash equilibrium exists when no agent within a game has the
incentive to unilaterally change his or her strategy. A Nash equilibrium may exist in the
form of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
(MSNE), or a partially mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (PMSNE). Importantly, a game
is not limited to holding one equilibrium and may hold many equilibria of different types.
While there exist many types of games, Hayhurst and Colombi considered strategicnormal form games in the development of the ACE taxonomy. In a two-player strategicnormal game-theoretic context, player one chooses from strategies enumerated by the
rows of a matrix while player two chooses from strategies enumerated by the columns of
a matrix; the intersection of the respective row and column is a cell which displays a
payoff for player one and player two. The Pareto front is formed by all non-dominated
outcomes of a set according to a specified number of attributes. That is, for any solution
on the Pareto front, the user cannot shift to a different solution within the set to improve
the score of an attribute without diminishing the score of a separate attribute. Within a
two-player game-theoretic context, each agent’s payoff exists as an attribute within a set
that forms a two-dimensional Pareto front. In the designation of attributes for a particular
cell of a matrix within the ACE taxonomy, Hayhurst and Colombi used red to represent
agent utility balance, yellow to represent Nash equilibria, and blue to represent the Pareto
front. Secondary colors are used to represent the combination of these attributes, white is
used to represent the presence of all three attributes, and gray is used to represent the
absence of all three attributes. Figure 5.1 is adapted from the work of Hayhurst and
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Colombi and presented to provide clarity on the ACE taxonomy. (Hayhurst & Colombi,
Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of Space Power, 2021)

Figure 5.1. Atomic Competitive Element Taxonomy
Parametric combat modeling came of age against the backdrop of World War I
when Lanchester developed his square and linear laws of combat. The Lanchester Square
Law and Lanchester Linear Law both use a system of differential equations to
mathematically model the interaction of two forces engaged in combat; the math shows
the induced attrition of each force over time. Encompassed within these equations are the
numbers of a particular unit for each belligerent as well as the attrition coefficient (that is,
fighting efficacy) of each respective force. (Lanchester, 1916) The Lotka-Volterra
Equations follow the general form of the Lanchester Equations in that the Lotka-Volterra
Equations present a system of differential equations. Generally considered in a biological
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context, the Lotka-Volterra Equations are an innovation on the logistic growth model.
Whereas logistic growth is a solid representation of intraspecific competition, the LotkaVolterra innovation enabled the modeling of interspecific competition. (Kingsland, 2015)
Brackney, following the same general mathematical form, was able to ground the
performance characteristics of a fighting force in tangible, discoverable phenomena.
Whereas Lanchester’s attrition coefficients were abstract concepts which required
empirical data pertinent to the model or educated speculation, the Brackney Equations
contain concrete parameters related to the search and destroy endeavors of two
belligerents. (Brackney, 1959) A limiting aspect in the usefulness of these models is their
assumption of homogeneity with respect to the fighting units within the fighting force of
each belligerent. Bonder and Farrell attempted to overcome this limitation with a
generalization of the Lanchester Equations. While Bonder and Farrell’s contribution to
this field is certainly meaningful, their attempt (by their own admission) was not a
complete success and encompassed significant methodological gaps. (Bonder & Farrell,
1970)
5.4 Methodology
MIWT and game theory both provide methodologies capable of distilling
complex force structures into tractable parametric, quantitative values. The parametric
values provided by MIWT and game theory may not be appropriate for use in highfidelity physics-based simulations where mathematical precision is at a premium (e.g.,
Systems Tool Kit); similarly, use of these parametric values in agent-based modeling
applications (e.g., Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling) may
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not be appropriate. However, parametric modeling and the quantitative values
encompassed therein may provide useful strategic insight for decision-makers responsible
for creating or modifying a force structure. Parametric modeling embodies a
complimentary role to high-fidelity physics-based methods as well as agent-based
methods. Parametric modeling can be executed relatively quickly and can provide a firstcut approach to the problem which will help guide the problem-solver and save time in
the long run. Parametric modeling can provide the intellectual basis for puzzle solving
conflict scenarios and may be used to communicate vast, complicated sets of information
to a broader audience which may include decision-makers. In considering a parametric
framework, the user would be wise to communicate results as approximations instead of
mathematically precise answers. Furthermore, the user should consider a stochastic range
of outcomes as opposed to a single deterministic answer. Having contextualized the
advantages and limitations of parametric conflict modeling, this section will demonstrate
the methodological approach of this work – the game-theoretic evaluation of MIWT will
be demonstrated using a notional example. In the game-theoretic evaluation of MIWT,
the emphasis will be on the discovery of the general alignment or lack thereof of the
results of the MIWT methodology and game-theoretic methodology.
The methodology of this evaluation will be demonstrated using the notional
MIWT force matrices shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
Table 5.2. Notional MIWT Blue Force Matrix
0.50
-1.00
-0.10

0.00
0.60
-0.90
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0.80
0.05
0.55

Table 5.3. Notional MIWT Red Force Matrix
0.40
-0.80
-0.25

0.20
0.30
-0.90

0.85
0.10
0.50

The determinants of the blue and red force matrices are 0.96 and 0.85,
respectively. Therefore, according to MIWT the fighting efficacies (attrition coefficients)
of the blue and red forces may be quantified as 0.96 and 0.85, respectively. Dividing the
blue attrition coefficient by the red attrition coefficient yields a determinant power ratio
(PR) of 1.13 indicating the blue force fields the more effective fighting capability
according to MIWT.
To begin the transition of these two matrices to a game-theoretic strategic-normal
form game, evaluate the element-wise absolute values of the matrices as shown in Table
5.4 and Table 5.5.
Table 5.4. Notional MIWT Blue Force Matrix with Positive Values
0.50
1.00
0.10

0.00
0.60
0.90

0.80
0.05
0.55

Table 5.5. Notional MIWT Red Force Matrix with Positive Values
0.40
0.80
0.25

0.20
0.30
0.90
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0.85
0.10
0.50

Next, transpose the blue force matrix as shown in Table 5.6 to achieve the correct
alignment between the offensive and defensive capabilities of the two belligerents within
the respective domains.
Table 5.6. Transposed Blue Force Matrix
0.50
0.00
0.80

1.00
0.60
0.05

0.10
0.90
0.55

Next, collate the blue force matrix and red force matrix into a strategic-normal form
game as shown in Table 5.7 where 𝑝𝐵𝑚 and 𝑝𝑅𝑛 represent the strategies which are played
with some proportion within the mixed strategy of the game.
Table 5.7. Notional Scenario
Red Player
Notional Scenario

Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

0.50, 0.40

1.00, 0.20

0.10, 0.85

𝑝𝐵2

0.00, 0.80

0.60, 0.30

0.90, 0.10

𝑝𝐵3

0.80, 0.25

0.05, 0.90

0.55, 0.50

Apply the ACE taxonomy using 0.10 for agent utility balance as shown in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8. Notional Scenario with ACE Taxonomy
Notional Scenario

Red Player
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Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

0.50, 0.40

1.00, 0.20

0.10, 0.85

𝑝𝐵2

0.00, 0.80

0.60, 0.30

0.90, 0.10

𝑝𝐵3

0.80, 0.25

0.05, 0.90

0.55, 0.50

This game encompasses no pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) and one mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium (MSNE) as a population parameter. The blue agent plays strategies 𝑝𝐵1 ,
𝑝𝐵2 , and 𝑝𝐵3 with approximate proportions 0.32, 0.33, 0.35, respectively. The red agent
plays strategies 𝑝𝑅1 , 𝑝𝑅2 , and 𝑝𝑅3 with approximate proportions 0.35, 0.28, and 0.36,
respectively. The aggregate utilities associated with this MSNE for the blue agent and red
agent are approximately 0.50 and 0.48, respectively. These payoffs serve as the attrition
coefficients in the game-theoretic context and yield an MSNE PR of 1.04 indicating the
blue force fields the more effective fighting capability according to game theory. In this
notional example, alignment of PR results may be observed between the MIWT approach
and the game-theoretic approach.
5.5 Analysis
This analysis uses seven scenarios from Scardera and Cesul’s work including five
historical battles between American and Japanese forces in the Pacific Theatre during
World War II and two hypothetical scenarios from the Cold War. The first Cold War
scenario examines a hypothetical conventional conflict between the United States and the
Soviet Union which excludes the use of the space domain. The second scenario also
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considers a conventional conflict but includes the use of assets in the space domain.
(Scardera & Cesul, 2021) Due to the high number of degenerate matrices which exclude
the use of an MSNE approach, the PSNE are provided to give the theoretical bounds of
an MSNE. An artificial balanced (all strategies are played with equal proportion) mixed
strategy PR is provided to enrich the analysis.
Table 5.9 displays the information pertinent to the initial landings. According to
MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 4.00 and 0.11,
respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 36.36. All three PSNE present a power
ratio of 2.70. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the balanced
PR is 3.41. While both approaches assert a more effective blue force, the MIWT
approach diverges much faster and gives a tremendous advantage to the blue force.
Table 5.9. Initial Landings
Red Player
Initial Landings

Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

1.00, 0.37

1.00, 0.22

1.00, 0.23

𝑝𝐵2

1.00, 0.37

1.00, 0.35

1.00, 0.19

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 0.37

1.00, 0.35

1.00, 0.19

Table 5.10 displays the information pertinent to the battle of Tanaru and East Solomons.
According to MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 1.90 and
3.24, respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 0.59. Both PSNE present a power
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ratio of 1.00. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the balanced
PR is 0.91. While both approaches assert a more effective red force, the MIWT approach
diverges faster and gives a greater advantage to the red force.

Table 5.10. Tanaru & East Solomons
Red Player
Tanaru & East Solomons

Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

1.00, 0.96

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.70

𝑝𝐵2

0.65, 0.96

0.45, 1.00

0.50, 0.75

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 0.96

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.99

Table 5.11 displays the information pertinent to the battle of Henderson Field and Santa
Cruz. According to MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 2.74
and 3.21, respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 0.85. The PSNE presents a
power ratio of 1.00. The balanced PR is 0.94. The disparate approaches are aligned in
terms of results.
Table 5.11. Henderson Field & Santa Cruz
Red Player
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Henderson Field & Santa
Cruz

Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

1.00, 0.96

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.83

𝑝𝐵2

0.88, 0.96

0.62, 1.00

0.74, 1.00

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 0.96

0.83, 1.00

1.00, 0.84

Table 5.12 displays the information pertinent to the naval battle and Japanese landings.
According to MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 1.77 and
2.38, respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 0.74. Both PSNE present a power
ratio of 1.00. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the balanced
PR is 0.87. The disparate approaches are aligned in terms of results.
Table 5.12. Naval Battle & Japanese Landings

Naval Battle & Japanese
Landings

Blue Player

Red Player
𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

0.73, 1.00

0.73, 1.00

0.73, 0.61

𝑝𝐵2

0.60, 1.00

0.52, 1.00

0.69, 0.82

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.58

Table 5.13 displays the information pertinent to the Japanese withdrawals. According to
MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 3.72 and 0.40,
respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 9.30. The PSNE present power ratios of
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1.47 and 1.85. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the balanced
PR is 1.95. While both approaches assert a more effective blue force, the MIWT
approach diverges faster and gives a greater advantage to the blue force.

Table 5.13. Japanese Withdrawals
Red Player
Japanese Withdrawals

Blue Player

𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝐵1

1.00, 0.26

1.00, 0.68

1.00, 0.54

𝑝𝐵2

1.00, 0.26

0.86, 1.00

1.00, 0.54

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 0.26

1.00, 0.54

1.00, 0.47

Table 5.14 displays the information pertinent to the Cold War excluding the space
domain. According to MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 1.92
and 2.65, respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 0.72. All three PSNE present
power ratios of 1.00. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the
balanced PR is 1.02. In this instance, the MIWT and game-theoretic approaches do not
align in terms of results.
Table 5.14. Cold War
Red Player
Cold War
𝑝𝑅1
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𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

Blue Player

𝑝𝐵1

0.58, 1.00

0.38, 0.67

0.58, 0.67

𝑝𝐵2

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.96

1.00, 0.47

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.61

1.00, 1.00

Table 5.15 displays the information pertinent to the Cold War including the space
domain. According to MIWT, the attrition coefficients of the blue and red forces are 1.79
and 5.59, respectively, which yields a determinant PR of 0.32. All four PSNE present
power ratios of 1.00. The matrix is degenerate and encompasses infinite PMSNE; the
balanced PR is 0.87. While both approaches assert a more effective red force, the MIWT
approach diverges faster and gives a greater advantage to the red force.
Table 5.15. Cold War with Space Domain

Cold War with Space
Domain

Blue
Player

Red Player
𝑝𝑅1

𝑝𝑅2

𝑝𝑅3

𝑝𝑅4

𝑝𝐵1

0.58, 1.00

0.38, 0.67

0.58, 0.67

0.58, 1.00

𝑝𝐵2

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.96

1.00, 0.47

0.50, 1.00

𝑝𝐵3

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 0.61

1.00, 1.00

1.00, 1.00

𝑝𝐵4

0.55, 1.00

0.78, 1.00

0.80, 0.65

0.39, 1.00

5.6 Conclusion
There exist several key takeaways from the game-theoretic analysis of MIWT.
Scardera and Cesul’s normalization mechanism generally leads to degenerate game-
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theoretic matrices rendering the MSNE approach non-applicable. In the case that a user
should want to conduct both MIWT and game-theoretic parametric analysis, the authors
recommend using a pairwise scoring scheme which does not cap at 1.00 or any number
except in exceptional circumstances. Such an approach will limit the occurrence of
weakly dominated solutions, degenerate matrices, and infinitely many PMSNE.
Increasing the frequency of non-degenerate matrices will enable the viable
implementation of an MSNE approach.
This work presented evidence that the game-theoretic methodology and MIWT
methodology provided a limited validation of each other. The game-theoretic results
generally concurred with the MIWT results, however, the MIWT results diverged faster.
This phenomenon occurred because game-theory is based on agent interaction while
MIWT is based on internal synergies of the respective belligerent’s fighting force. The
former approach leads to more conservative linear combinations of the data whereas the
latter uses divergent non-linear combinations of the data. Which approach is more
accurate is likely highly context-specific and the authors recommend using both
parametric methods to achieve a robust understanding of the situation. The user can
execute both approaches relatively quickly and in doing so may save valuable time in the
long term before modeling efforts progress to more complex high-fidelity physics-based
or agent-based modeling endeavors.
The United States presently contends with peer adversaries on the world stage; the
need to achieve a capable and effective force structure, especially in the context of an
emerging space domain, is extremely important. The integration of these MIWT and
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game-theoretic methodologies into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System (JCIDS) process, Materiel Solution Analysis Phase, or Technology Maturation
and Risk Reduction Phase of the U.S. Department of Defense acquisitions processes
would enhance the U.S. force structure and improve the fighting efficacy of the U.S.
military. These parametric modeling methodologies can provide valuable strategic insight
to policy-makers and decision-makers and advance the security posture of the United
States.
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Chapter 6: A Methodological Framework for Parametric Combat Analysis
6.1 Abstract
This work proposes, explains, and demonstrates a methodological framework
which affords decision-makers and policy-makers the opportunity to accelerate the tempo
and enhance the quality of the U.S. Department of Defense acquisitions community. The
effective implementation of this framework will augment the warfighting capability of
the U.S. Department of Defense against peer competitors and advance the security
posture of the United States. This work provides a theoretical foundation for explaining
the distribution of potential outcomes for certain types of warfare while contextualizing
the research to the space domain. This framework utilizes reliability models to account
for natural attrition while using combat models to account for induced attrition. The use
of game-theoretic concepts enables the evaluation of heterogeneous force structures.
6.2 Introduction
In order for the United States to prevail against a peer competitor in a time of
conflict, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must develop an acquisitions community
which fields new capabilities within an operationally relevant timeframe. Pushing the
current acquisitions community to achieve such a goal is a challenging, complex, and
multifaceted undertaking which will not be comprehensively addressed within the scope
of this article. This work will focus on a specific aspect of the endeavor to accelerate the
acquisitions community: how does modeling and simulation inform the acquisitions
organizations responsible for the procurement of DoD weapon systems? That is, which
systems should the DoD develop and how many of those systems should the DoD
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produce? The aim of the methodological framework expounded in this paper is to enable
the user to conduct parametric combat analysis to project the efficacy of various force
compositions – such analysis should support the user in making intelligent and informed
procurement decisions.
In order to effectively use the framework discussed in this article, the user must
accept the premise that a knowledgeable person could capture the physical phenomena
associated with various combat scenarios and express the dynamics of those scenarios in
mathematical representations. The user must understand that these mathematical
representations encompass parameters which the user may adjust to accurately represent
a particular situation in an effort to make an educated prediction concerning the future.
The user should not view parametric modeling as a replacement for agent-based
modeling (e.g., Advanced Framework for Simulation, Integration, and Modeling) or
high-fidelity physics-based modeling (e.g., Systems Tool Kit); parametric modeling is
complementary to other modeling methods.
The literature review section of this paper will provide the reader with an
academic grounding for the material encompassed with the framework. The methodology
section of this paper will present the framework, discuss how various phenomena
influence a given instantiation of the framework, and provide an algorithm for a
particular instantiation of the framework. The contextualization of framework to the
space domain section will discuss potential environments, belligerents, and weapons of a
possible space conflict. The numerical demonstration of methodology section of this
article will discuss the distribution of potential outcomes for different kinds of conflict
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and cover multiple notional scenarios between a blue force and a red force. Finally, the
conclusion of this article will summarize this work and its recommendations.
6.3 Literature Review
This section reviews literature pertinent to this article, specifically focusing on
probability theory, game theory, and combat modeling.
The exponential distribution is a parametric distribution often used in reliability
modeling to characterize the time to failure of entities within a data set. The probability
density function (PDF) may be expressed as
−

𝑡

𝑒 𝛽
𝑓 (𝑡 ) =
𝛽
with the support of 𝑡 ranging from zero to infinity and 𝛽 representing the scale parameter
which is also known as the characteristic lifespan; 𝛽 also exists as the expected value of
the distribution. (Casella & Berger, 2002) The exponential distribution is memoryless,
tractable, and corresponds to the operational phase of life. The cumulative distribution
function (CDF) may be presented as
𝐹 (𝑡 ) = 1 − 𝑒

−

𝑡
𝛽

The reliability function may be presented as
𝑅 (𝑡 ) = 𝑒

𝑡
−
𝛽

The hazard function may be presented as
−

ℎ(𝑡 ) =

𝑓 (𝑡 )
=
𝑅 (𝑡 )
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𝑡

𝑒 𝛽
𝛽
𝑡
−
𝑒 𝛽

=

1
𝛽

which corresponds to the constant failure rate of
1
𝛽

𝜆=

The Weibull distribution is a generalized form of the exponential distribution that
can account for beneficial or deleterious aging at the cost of less tractability. (Casella &
Berger, 2002) The PDF of the Weibull distribution may be expressed as

𝑓 (𝑡 ) =

𝑒

−

𝑡𝛾
𝛽

𝛽

𝛾𝑡 𝛾−1

with the support of 𝑡 ranging from zero to infinity and 𝛾 representing the shape parameter
of the distribution. 𝛾 < 1 indicates beneficial aging where failure rate decreases with
respect to time; 𝛾 = 1 indicates memoryless aging (i.e., the exponential distribution); 𝛾 >
1 indicates deleterious aging where failure rate increases with respect to time; 𝛾 = 2
indicates the linear increase of failure rate with respect to time (i.e., the Rayleigh
distribution). The CDF of the Weibull distribution may be presented as
𝐹 (𝑡 ) = 1 −

𝑡𝛾
−
𝑒 𝛽

The reliability function may be presented as
𝑅 (𝑡 ) =

𝑡𝛾
−
𝑒 𝛽

The hazard function may be presented as
𝑡𝛾
−
𝑒 𝛽

𝛾−1
𝑓 (𝑡 )
𝛾𝑡 𝛾−1
𝛽 𝛾𝑡
ℎ(𝑡 ) =
=
=
𝑡𝛾
𝑅 (𝑡 )
𝛽
−
𝑒 𝛽
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The Weibull distribution is related to the exponential distribution through the random
variable transformation
𝑋𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙 =

1
𝛾
𝑋𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙

Hayhurst and Colombi developed the Atomic Competitive Element (ACE)
taxonomy for categorizing game-theoretic scenarios according to attributes desirable for
the stability of an outcome within a game. (Hayhurst & Colombi, Game-Theoretic
System Design in the Development of Space Power, 2021) The ACE taxonomy uses red
to designate balance optimality, yellow to designate Nash optimality, and blue to
designate Pareto optimality; secondary colors are used to represent the combination of
these attributes, white is used to represent the presence of all three attributes, and gray is
used to represent the absence of all three attributes. Within a given cell of a normal-form
game, red indicates the agents’ payoffs are approximately the same, yellow indicates the
cell is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (no agent has incentive to unilaterally change
their decision), and blue indicates the cell is on the Pareto front (no agent’s payoff may
be improved without diminishing another agent’s payoff). Figure 6.1 is adapted from the
work of Hayhurst and Colombi and presented to provide clarity on the ACE taxonomy.
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Figure 6.1. Atomic Competitive Element Taxonomy
Hayhurst and Colombi developed and presented eight specific ACEs for eight
common games including Deadlock, Pure Coordination, Stag Hunt, Matching Pennies,
Stoplight, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Take or Share, and Chicken. (Hayhurst & Colombi,
Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of Space Power, 2021)
The Lanchester Linear Law describes the attrition of two belligerents (described
here as the blue force and red force or simply blue and red) under simplified engagement
assumptions – two belligerents engage in a decisive conflict at a concrete focal point
using unaimed fire; this law depends on the homogeneity of units on either side of the
conflict and assumes a generally uniform distribution of fire from one side against the
other. The Lanchester Linear Law may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
= −𝑟𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
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𝑑𝑅
= −𝑏𝐵𝑅
𝑑𝑡
such that
𝑏 ~ 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑟 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐵 ~ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
𝑅 ~ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒
In the case of the Lanchester Linear Law, the attrition rate for both blue and red is a
function of the size of both forces. In this case, the fighting strength of each force may be
presented as
𝐹𝐵 = 𝑏𝐵
𝐹𝑅 = 𝑟𝑅
The Lanchester Square Law assumes that each belligerent uses aimed fire and otherwise
shares the same assumptions as the Lanchester Linear Law. The Lanchester Square Law
may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
= −𝑟𝑅
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑅
= −𝑏𝐵
𝑑𝑡
Here, the blue (red) attrition rate is a function of the red’s (blue’s) force size. In this case,
the fighting strength of each force may be presented as
𝐹𝐵 = 𝑏𝐵2
𝐹𝑅 = 𝑟𝑅2
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For both the Lanchester Linear Law and the Lanchester Square Law, the force with the
greater fighting strength will win the conflict. (Lanchester, 1916)
The Bonder Law is a generalized form of the Lanchester Square Law and may be
presented as
𝑁

𝑑𝐵𝑚
= − ∑ 𝑟𝑚,𝑛 𝑅𝑛
𝑑𝑡

𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1, 2, … , 𝑀

𝑛=1
𝑀

𝑑𝑅𝑛
= − ∑ 𝑏𝑚,𝑛 𝐵𝑚
𝑑𝑡

𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 = 1, 2, … , 𝑁

𝑚=1

The Bonder Law shares the same assumptions as the Lanchester Square Law with the
exception that the Bonder Law allows for heterogeneity within each belligerent force
structure. (Bonder & Farrell, 1970)
The Lotka-Volterra Interspecific Competition Law may be presented as
𝑑𝑁1
𝐾1 − 𝑁1 − 𝛼𝑁2
= 𝑟1 𝑁1 (
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾1
𝑑𝑁2
𝐾2 − 𝑁2 − 𝛽𝑁1
= 𝑟2 𝑁2 (
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾2
such that
𝑟 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑁 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐾 ~ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝛼 ~ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 2 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 1
𝛽 ~ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 2
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The Lotka-Volterra Interspecific Competition Law is based on the logistic growth model
used to characterize intraspecific competition. The Lotka-Volterra Interspecific
Competition Law assumes that two distinct, homogenous species compete over a
common set of resources in a mutually deleterious manner to ensure population growth
success up to the carrying capacity of the pertinent environment. (Kingsland, 2015) In a
conflict scenario in which the belligerents encompass certain characteristics of
interspecific competition such as a carrying capacity, logistic growth, and competition
over common resources, a Lanchester-Lotka-Volterra Hybrid Law (Hayhurst, Colombi,
& Meyer, Aggregated space combat modeling, 2021) may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
𝐾𝐵 − 𝐵 − 𝑟𝑅
= 𝐵(
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾𝐵
𝑑𝑅
𝐾𝑅 − 𝑅 − 𝑏𝐵
= 𝑅(
)
𝑑𝑡
𝐾𝑅
where 𝐾 is still the respective carrying capacity of both entities, 𝛼 and 𝛽 have been
replaced with the attrition rates of both entities, 𝑟 and 𝑏, and 𝑅 and 𝐵 are the force sizes.
In this scenario, the goal of conflict is the establishment of a dominant ecological
isocline. There exist four isocline scenarios which determine the fate of the conflict. In
the case of a dominant blue isocline, the following inequalities hold:
𝐾𝐵 >

𝐾𝑅
𝑏

𝐾𝐵
> 𝐾𝑅
𝑟
The blue force will eliminate the red force and grow to its natural carrying capacity.
Likewise, a dominant red isocline occurs when:
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𝐾𝑅 >

𝐾𝐵
𝑟

𝐾𝑅
> 𝐾𝐵
𝑏
The red force will eliminate the blue force and grow to its natural carrying capacity. The
isoclines present divergent bifurcation when
𝐾𝐵 >

𝐾𝑅
𝑏

𝐾𝑅 >

𝐾𝐵
𝑟

In this scenario, the outcome of the conflict hinges on the parameter values of the
respective carrying capacities and attrition coefficients as well as the initial size of each
belligerent force. Finally, the isoclines present convergent behavior when
𝐾𝐵
> 𝐾𝑅
𝑟
𝐾𝑅
> 𝐾𝐵
𝑏
In this case, the size of each force will converge to a steady equilibrium. (Olson, 2014)
The Brackney Law may be presented as
𝑑𝐵
𝑅𝐵𝑆𝑅
=−
𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝐵 𝐵𝑆𝑅 + 𝑉𝐵
𝑑𝑅
𝐵𝑅𝑆𝐵
=−
𝑑𝑡
𝑇𝑅 𝑅𝑆𝐵 + 𝑉𝑅
such that
𝑆𝐵 ~ 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑉𝐵 ~ 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑦 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑦
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𝑇𝐵 ~ 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡
The Brackney Law integrates the fog of war into parametric modeling by describing two
distinct, homogenous forces which must find the constituent parts of the adversary force
before the destructive engagements may occur; this law assumes a random uniform
distribution of each force throughout its respective volume. (Brackney, 1959) The use of
the Brackney Law requires knowledge of the specific, tangible capabilities of the fighting
units which compose each force. (Washburn & Kress, 2009) Hayhurst et al. adapted the
Brackney Law for use in three-dimensional space. (Hayhurst, Colombi, & Meyer,
Aggregated space combat modeling, 2021)
6.4 Methodology
This section articulates the methodology of this work by describing the general
mathematical construct of the integrated framework. This section also presents a
mathematically symbolic demonstration of a specific instantiation of the framework to
facilitate understanding. Consider the integrated framework for analysis in its general
form presented in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. Integrated Framework in General Form
This integrated framework encompasses five modules which include the parametric
inputs, reliability model, game-theoretic model, combat model, and parametric outputs.
The necessary inputs and natural outputs of the framework are based on the specific
models chosen by the user to fill in the reliability, game-theoretic, and combat modules;
the user should choose models which accurately represent the physical phenomenon
under consideration. This modularized approach provides flexibility and adaptability to
the user.
The reliability model accounts for the “cold phase” of conflict – a long-duration,
low-intensity period characterized by natural attrition (e.g., a spacecraft loses
functionality because of battery decay). The reliability model uses a parametric
distribution such as (but not limited to) the exponential or Weibull. The reliability model
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enables the framework to determine the losses associated with the cold phase of conflict
for each belligerent. The reliability model receives information from the parametric
inputs and provides information to the game-theoretic model and combat model.
The game-theoretic model is an 𝑛 × 𝑚 strategic-normal form game which may
manifest or resemble an atomic competitive element such as (but not limited to)
Deadlock, Pure Coordination, Stag Hunt, Stoplight, Matching Pennies, Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Take or Share, or Chicken. The game-theoretic model enables the framework
to calculate aggregate attrition coefficients from a larger set of pairwise attrition
coefficients. The game-theoretic model receives information from the parametric inputs
and reliability model and provides information to the combat model.
The combat model accounts for the “hot phase” of conflict – a short-duration,
high-intensity period characterized by combat-induced attrition (e.g., a spacecraft loses
functionality because of the hostile use of a directed energy weapon). The combat model
uses a system of differential equations such as (but not limited to) the Lanchester Linear
Law, Lanchester Square Law, Lotka-Volterra Equations, or Brackney Equations. The
combat model enables the framework to determine the losses associated with the hot
phase of conflict for each belligerent. The combat model receives information from the
parametric inputs, reliability model, and game-theoretic model and provides information
to the parametric outputs.
This work will now transition from describing the general form of the framework
to articulating a specific instantiation of the framework. The purpose of this illustration is
to provide clarity on how the framework might be used; expounding the comprehensive
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set of uses for the framework in detail would be too expansive. During this symbolic
demonstration, the quantity of a given fighting capability is expressed in a fictional
currency for three reasons. First, using a fictional currency emphasizes the notional
nature of this demonstration – a notional example facilitates public release and broad
readership access. Second, while the combat models of this framework traditionally
considered the number of fighting units within a capability such an approach might
damage the composability of the model whenever a discrepancy in unit cost exists
between capabilities. Accounting for the amount of resources invested into a capability
instead of the number of fighting units embodied within that capability helps to ensure
composability within the framework. Finally, various real-world currencies differ in
value and the purchasing power parity from one nation to the next might be starkly
different. Essentially, the framework must capture how the purchasing power of a
particular belligerent is spent – that is, any amount of purchasing power spent on a
particular capability is assumed to be resources not spent on a separate, distinct capability
within the same fighting force. The game-theoretic principles are then able to inform the
effective allocation of finite resources.
With the groundwork for this example laid, consider two belligerents which act as
peer competitors wherein each belligerent simultaneously invests a particular amount of
currency into two capabilities each. As peer competitors, each belligerent must strive to
match their strength to the weakness of their opponent over the course of combat. The
game-theoretic model is, therefore, a two-by-two strategic-normal form matrix which
embodies the Matching Pennies game. Consider that each capability is in the operational

96

phase of its lifecycle. Therefore, the reliability model uses the exponential distribution.
Consider that each capability does not reproduce, uses aimed fire at a decisive focal point
of conflict, and is supported by an effective space domain awareness architecture.
Therefore, the combat model uses the Lanchester Square Law. The correct module
loadout of the general framework for this scenario is shown in Figure 6.3.

Figure 6.3. Framework with Module Loadout
In order to carry out the analysis of this scenario using the integrated framework,
utilize the following process. First, the user supplies 26 parametric inputs including the
initial investment in each capability (𝐵1𝛼 , 𝐵2𝛼 , 𝑅1𝛼 , 𝑅2𝛼 ), the characteristic lifespan for
the units of currency for each capability (𝛽𝐵1𝛼 , 𝛽𝐵2𝛼 , 𝛽𝑅1𝛼 , 𝛽𝑅2𝛼 ), the expected value and
variability associated with each pairwise attrition coefficient (𝜇𝑏1,1 , 𝜇𝑏1,2 , 𝜇𝑏2,1 , 𝜇𝑏2,2 ,
𝜇𝑟1,1 , 𝜇𝑟1,2 , 𝜇𝑟2,1 , 𝜇𝑟2,2 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑏1,1 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑏1,2 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑏2,1 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑏2,2 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑟1,1 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑟1,2 , [𝜎 2 ]𝑟2,1 ,
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[𝜎 2 ]𝑟2,2 ), and the time spent in the cold and hot phases of the conflict (𝑡𝑐 , 𝑡ℎ ). Next,
generate a normal distribution for each pairwise attrition coefficient and randomly draw a
number from each of those normal distributions to determine the value for each pairwise
attrition coefficient.
1

𝑓(𝑏1,1 ) =
√

2𝜋[𝜎 2 ]

𝑒

(𝑏1,1 −𝜇𝑏1,1 )
−
2[𝜎 2 ]𝑏1,1

𝑒

(𝑟2,2 −𝜇𝑟2,2 )
−
2[𝜎 2 ]𝑟2,2

2

𝑏1,1

…
2

1

𝑓(𝑟2,2 ) =
√

2𝜋[𝜎 2 ]

𝑟2,2

Calculate the remaining investment after natural attrition during the cold phase by
multiplying the initial investment by the exponential reliability function.
𝐵1 = 𝐵1𝛼 𝑒

𝑡
− 𝑐
𝛽𝐵1𝛼

𝐵2 = 𝐵2𝛼 𝑒

𝑡
− 𝑐
𝛽𝐵2𝛼

𝑅1 = 𝑅1𝛼 𝑒
𝑅2 = 𝑅2𝛼 𝑒

−

𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝑅1𝛼

−

𝑡𝑐
𝛽𝑅2𝛼

Calculate the game-theoretic mixed strategy as a population parameter for each
belligerent. To do this, calculate the proportion of the remaining investment which each
capability constitutes. In this game-theoretic context, the mixed strategy exists as a
population parameter wherein instead of two decisions being made with certain
probabilities there exist two populations with certain proportions of subpopulations.
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Table 6.1 provides a symbolic representation of Matching Pennies and affords clarity on
the associated calculations.
𝑝𝐵1 =

𝐵1
𝐵1 + 𝐵2

𝑝𝐵2 =

𝐵2
𝐵1 + 𝐵2

𝑝𝑅1 =

𝑅1
𝑅1 + 𝑅2

𝑝𝑅2 =

𝑅2
𝑅1 + 𝑅2

Table 6.1. Symbolic Representation of Matching Pennies

Determine the aggregate attrition coefficients by multiplying the probabilities within the
three-dimensional probability mass function by the associated payoffs. The payoffs are
the pairwise attrition coefficients.
𝑏 = 𝑝𝐵1 𝑝𝑅1 𝑏1,1 + 𝑝𝐵1 𝑝𝑅2 𝑏1,2 + 𝑝𝐵2 𝑝𝑅1 𝑏2,1 + 𝑝𝐵2 𝑝𝑅2 𝑏2,2
𝑟 = 𝑝𝐵1 𝑝𝑅1 𝑟1,1 + 𝑝𝐵1 𝑝𝑅2 𝑟1,2 + 𝑝𝐵2 𝑝𝑅1 𝑟2,1 + 𝑝𝐵2 𝑝𝑅2 𝑟2,2
Calculate the aggregate remaining investment for each belligerent after natural attrition.
𝐵 = 𝐵1 + 𝐵2
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𝑅 = 𝑅1 + 𝑅2
Enable the simulation to run for the hot phase time using the Lanchester Square Law
system of differential equations.
𝑑𝐵
= −𝑟𝑅
𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝑅
= −𝑏𝐵
𝑑𝑡
Calculate the margin of victory (or defeat) at the end of the conflict.
M = 𝐵|𝑡=𝑡ℎ − 𝑅|𝑡=𝑡ℎ
Since the simulation is stochastic, the user should run the simulation over multiple
iterations – such an approach will provide a range of outcomes to articulate the possible
results of the physical phenomena.
6.5 Contextualization of Framework to the Space Domain
The universe holds countless numbers of galaxies including the Milky Way which
holds countless numbers of stars including Sol. The Sol System presents three regions
known as the Inner Solar System, Outer Solar System, and Trans-Neptunian Region. The
Inner Solar System encompasses the objects within the orbit of Jupiter. The Outer Solar
System encompasses the objects between the orbits of Jupiter and Neptune, inclusive.
The Trans-Neptunian Region extends from the orbit of Neptune to the boundary of the
Sol System – considered either as the heliopause or the limit of space dominated by Sol’s
gravity. Together, the Inner Solar System and Outer Solar System constitute the Planetary
Region – this work focuses primarily on the Planetary Region. The Trans-Neptunian
Region holds the Kuiper Belt, Scattered Disc, heliopause, Detached Objects Region, and
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the theoretical Oort Cloud which may exist. Many objects move between multiple
regions such as comets which transit across most of the Solar System and sednoids which
transit between the Scattered Disc and the Detached Objects Region. The Planetary
Region encompasses twenty-eight objects approximately rounded by the force of gravity
including (listed by proximity to Sol and, in the case of natural satellites, proximity to
planet) Sol, Mercury, Venus, Earth, Luna, Mars, Ceres, Jupiter, Io, Europa, Ganymede,
Callisto, Saturn, Mimas, Enceladus, Tethys, Dione, Rhea, Titan, Iapetus, Uranus,
Miranda, Ariel, Umbriel, Titania, Oberon, Neptune, and Triton. The Planetary Region
also encompasses many non-spherical objects such as the asteroids of the Inner Solar
System and the centaurs of the Outer Solar System. Any large-scale space conflict in the
ten-to-twenty-year timeframe will likely be hosted by one of the twenty-eight Planetary
Region objects in approximate hydrostatic equilibrium. An evaluation of the habitability
and resources of these celestial bodies as well as the state and trajectory of human
technology enables an educated prediction of humanity’s exploration (conflict) path. This
work predicts that humanity’s exploration over the next thirty years will focus on Luna,
Mars, Ceres, Callisto, and Titan. The Moon will probably undergo the most robust
exploration and resource utilization and as such cislunar warfare constitutes the primary
context for this work.
The Moon will likely transform into a vital economic hub for the spacefaring
nations. The focal points of this economic center would include resource harvesting,
manufacturing, and lunar gateway transit. With respect to resource harvesting, the Moon
may yield an abundant supply of rare-earth metals (REM) and Helium-3.
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(911Metallurgist, 2015) Even if humanity fails to profitably harvest resources directly
from the Moon, Luna could host processing centers built to extract resources from
asteroids. Japan already conducted successful sample returns from the asteroids Itokawa
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016) and Ryugu (Shekhtman, 2020) while the
United States currently attempts a successful sample return from the asteroid Bennu.
(Garner, 2021) Spacefaring nations may one day harvest precious and industrial metals
from asteroids such as 16 Psyche, 1986 DA, and 2016 ED85. (Carter, 2021) In the
development of the space economy, nations and organizations may determine that
transporting asteroids or asteroid fragments to the Moon for extraction yields a greater
profit than direct harvesting. Also in consideration of an economic calculus, nations and
organizations may decide to manufacture some items on the Moon rather than transport
those items from Earth. The upcoming On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and
Manufacturing 2 (OSAM-2, previously Archinaut One) mission scheduled to launch no
earlier than 2022 will strive to mature the technology associated with microgravity
manufacturing. (Harbaugh, 2021) Finally, with humanity’s desire to visit Mars and
beyond, there exists a high probability that manufacturers design some vehicles
specialized for Earth-to-Moon transportation and others for transportation beyond the
Moon. A lunar gateway would serve as a natural off-loading and on-loading point. The
nation that controls Luna in part or in whole would reap tremendous economic benefits
from these activities.
A key indicator of a nation’s desire and ability to conduct a space conflict is the
pace at which that nation develops space weapons and the demonstrable efficacy of those
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weapons. While the weaponization of space may take many forms, the fielding of
effective direct ascent antisatellite (DA-ASAT) weapons provides an important
benchmark for a nation’s progress. Perhaps the five most pertinent events related to DAASAT weapons include
the 1985 destruction of the US P78-1 Solwind satellite, using an airlaunched ASM-135 (during the era of the Strategic Defense
Initiative), the 2007 destruction of the Chinese FY-1C (Fengyun,
“Wind and Cloud”) satellite using a ground-launched SC-19, the
2008 destruction of the US USA-193 satellite using a sea-launched
Standard Missile-3 (Operation Burnt Frost), [] the 2019 destruction
of the Indian Microsat-R satellite using a ground-launched Prithvi
Defense Vehicle Mark-II (Mission Shakti, “Power”), (Hayhurst &
Colombi, Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development of
Space Power, 2021)
and the 2021 destruction of the Russian Kosmos 1408 using a ground-launched A-235
PL-19 Nudol. (Wolfe, 2021) During each test, the satellite was destroyed by its owner;
the Russian and (especially) Chinese tests contributed significantly to the formation of
geocentric Kessler fields.
The range of space weapon types extends beyond the kinetic DA-ASAT variants
and can include dual-use technology. In 2010, China launched the SJ-12 (Shijian,
“Practice”) satellite into low Earth orbit (LEO) to conduct a series of rendezvous and
proximity operations (RPO) maneuvers with SJ-06F; the two satellites likely made low-
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speed contact. (Harrison, Johnson, & Roberts, 2018) In 2016, China launched the SJ-17
into geostationary orbit where it conducted proximity operations with multiple Chinese
satellites. (Roberts, 2021) The Chinese space endeavor made great strides during 2016,
also launching the Aolong-1 (“Proud Dragon”) and the Tianyuan-1 (“Fields and
Gardens”). Aolong-1 matured robotic arm grappling technology while Tianyuan-1
reportedly demonstrated spacecraft-to-spacecraft refueling. In 2021, China launched the
SJ-21 into geostationary orbit where it docked with the defunct Beidou-2 (“Northern
Dipper”) G2 navigation satellite. (Jones, 2022) In the beginning of 2022, SJ-21 pulled the
defunct navigation satellite 3,000 km above the geostationary belt. While not a
comprehensive review of space weaponry, these highlights provide insight into the steady
transformation of space into a warfighting domain.
Another important indicator of a nation’s space capabilities is the ability of that
nation to visit celestial bodies. In a joint effort with the European Space Agency (ESA),
Russia conducted a crash landing on Mars in 2016 with the ExoMars Schiaparelli EDM
Lander – Russia intended to conduct a soft landing. (NASA, n.d.) India conducted two
hard landings on the Moon in 2008 and 2019. India planned for the impact probe released
from the Chandrayaan-1 (“Moon Craft”) to conduct a hard landing in 2008. (Barnett,
n.d.) However, India intended the 2019 Chandrayaan-2 mission to conduct a soft landing.
(Williams, 2022) China conducted a Martian soft landing in 2021 with the Tianwen-1
(“Heavenly Questions”) Lander. (Stein, 2021) China also conducted multiple soft
landings on the Moon’s surface, the most impressive of which, Chang’e 5 (“Goddess of
the Moon”), conducted a robotic sample return. (The Planetary Society, n.d.) While
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China challenges the United States as the vanguard of space exploration, the U.S. freemarket enterprise continues to experience tremendous and promising growth. Newcomers
such as Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and especially SpaceX seek to challenge traditional
mainstays such as the United Launch Alliance in the space industry sphere. In recent
years, U.S. celestial surface exploration efforts focused primarily on Mars with a series of
successful soft landings on the Martian surface, with the 2021 Perseverance mission
constituting the most recent U.S. success. (NASA, n.d.)
6.6 Numerical Demonstration of Methodology
This section provides a numerical demonstration of the methodological
framework using the mathematical symbolic demonstration of the previous section as the
foundational algorithm. The Python software package implemented in a Spyder
integrated development environment (IDE) provides the computational capability for this
demonstration; although a specific language and IDE are used for this demonstration, the
methodological framework presented in this work is agnostic to any particular
computational implementation. Any parameter values used in this demonstration are
purely notional and only for the purpose of demonstrating the potential of the
methodology of the previous section of this article. For simplicity and clarity, these
scenarios assume each fighting unit of each capability consumes an equal amount of
purchasing power; belligerents are not necessarily assumed to hold equal purchasing
power.
Given parity, the distribution of outcomes for a Lanchester Square Law scenario
under this framework follows a pronounced bimodality as shown in Figure 6.4. Values
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along the x-axis indicate the numerical discrepancy between the two belligerents at the
end of the interaction while the y-axis values indicate the number of times such a
discrepancy occurred. This divergence is caused by the bifurcating nature of the
Lanchester Square Law which represents the underlying phenomena of aimed combat.
That is, unless the dynamics of the conflict change or a latent advantage begins to
manifest, small advantages will tend to snowball into increasingly larger advantages. This
provides a theoretical foundation for explaining the extraordinary difficulty of predicting
the outcome of a decisive peer conflict using aimed fire; approximately mean outcomes
of such a conflict are extremely unlikely to occur. Attrition coefficients assume an
expected value and variability of one.

Figure 6.4. Bimodal Lanchester Square Law Outcome Distribution – 100,000 Runs
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Given parity, the distribution of outcomes for a Lanchester Linear Law scenario under
this framework presents a trapezoidal shape as shown in Figure 6.5. Unaimed combat
does not experience the snowball effect of aimed combat; outcomes within a range of
numerical parity are approximately equally likely. Attrition coefficients assume an
expected value and variability of one.

Figure 6.5. Trapezoidal Linear Law Outcome Distribution – 100,000 Runs
Given parity, the distribution of outcomes for a Brackney Law scenario under this
framework presents a shape in between the square and linear law distribution shapes as
shown in Figure 6.6. This result is expected as the Brackney Law behavior shifts from
linear law behavior to square law behavior as the conflict phases from kill-time
dominated to search-time dominated. Attrition coefficients assume an expected value and
variability of one.
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Figure 6.6. Brackney Law Outcome Distribution – 100,000 Runs
Given parity, the distribution of outcomes for a Hybrid Law scenario under this
framework presents a uniform shape with two spikes at the extremes as shown in Figure
6.7. The uniform component of the distribution represents stable equilibria while the
spikes represent extinction events. Attrition coefficients assume an expected value and
variability of one while carrying capacities assume a value of 2,000.
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Figure 6.7. Hybrid Law Outcome Distribution – 100,000 Runs
Figures 9 through 11 afford further understanding of how parity shapes outcome
distributions – each figure displays the results of a Lanchester Square Law conflict over
10,000 simulation runs in which positive numerical values along the x-axis indicate a
blue numerical advantage at the end of the conflict while negative values indicate a red
numerical advantage. Figure 6.8 demonstrates the case of qualitative and quantitative
parity. Attrition coefficients assume an expected value and variability of one.
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Figure 6.8. Balanced Parity
Figure 6.9 illustrates the case wherein the expected quality of blue forces is four times
greater than that of red forces but red presents a force which is quantitatively twice as
large as blue forces. Blue boasts 500 fighting units of each capability while red boasts
1,000 fighting units of each capability. All red specific attrition coefficients assume an
expected value of one while blue attrition coefficients assume an expected value of four;
the variability of all attrition coefficients is one.
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Figure 6.9. Imbalanced Parity
Figure 6.10 illustrates the case wherein red is provided with a ten percent boost to the
quantity and quality of its forces relative to blue – conferring such an advantage
significantly impacts the distribution of potential conflict outcomes. Blue boasts 500
units of each capability with expected attrition coefficients of one. Red boasts 550 units
of each capability with expected attrition coefficients of 1.10.
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Figure 6.10. Lack of Parity
While Figure 6.10 illustrates a straightforward way for a belligerent to gain a numerical
advantage in conflict, more nuanced methods do exist. Consider a space conflict scenario
between blue and red using directed energy weapons (DEW) and robotic weapons (RW)
in which blue fields capabilities with expected pairwise attrition coefficients of one, two,
three, and four while red fields capabilities with coefficients four, three, two, and one as
shown in Table 6.2. Consider that blue and red present the same number of total fighting
units.
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Table 6.2. Cislunar Conflict Game

In such a case, blue DEW perform poorly against red DEW and marginally against red
RW; blue RW perform well against red DEW and dominantly against red RW. While
such a scenario may seem completely balanced, blue holds an incredibly advantageous
position through game-theoretic system design since blue RW versus red DEW exists as
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However, even in such an advantageous position, blue
must still present sufficient competence in force composition to finish the conflict in a
numerically advantageous position. For example, if blue invests in 1,500 DEW and 500
RW while red invests in 500 DEW and 1,500 RW, red will likely end the conflict in a
numerically advantageous position as shown in Figure 6.11.
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Figure 6.11. Resource Parity, Suboptimal Blue Force Composition
A competent opponent will take advantage of unforced game-theoretic errors.
6.7 Conclusion
This work presented a methodological framework for parametric combat analysis
in order to improve the security posture of the United States. After discussing pertinent
literature and the methodological framework as well as contextualizing this work to the
space domain, this article provided demonstrations of the framework. Though
contextualized in this work to the space domain where necessary, this methodological
framework could be applied to any domain of combat given that the user characterizes
the underlying phenomena with the correct mathematical representations.
The author recommends the U.S. DoD acquisitions community uses this
methodological framework to accelerate the capability development tempo to an
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operationally relevant timeframe. The flexible modularity of this framework enhances the
ability of the user to customize the modeling and simulation as necessary. The framework
is compatible with game-theoretic concepts which can help the user to optimize force
compositions and predict agent behavior. While not a wargame in and of itself, this
framework could be used as a wargaming tool to bolster objective analysis. The United
States faces multiple peer competitors and is steadily losing military preeminence.
Spending significant resources on national defense is no longer sufficient; the United
States must invest in capabilities wisely to effectively compete in an increasingly
multipolar world.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusions and Significance of Research
In answering the question on how game theory can inform spacepower, this
dissertation asserted that an agent could play optimally in a strategic-normal form game
given knowledge of agent behavior and payoffs. While game theory has long been used
for decision-making, the Atomic Competitive Element (ACE) taxonomy articulated the
interplay between the nature of the relationship of the agents and the different
optimization strategies. Through this process, eight fundamental ACEs were formed and
contextualized to the emerging space warfare domain. These ACEs afford game-theoretic
heuristics to the game player or designer so as to play or design the game for the benefit
of the preferred agent. In doing so, this work created a new taxonomic structure for
understanding the tension between factors of stability in game-theoretic outcomes and
used that structure to advance strategic thought on spacepower
In answering the question on how aggregated combat models can be applied to
space conflict, this dissertation adapted and extended parametric modeling to a threedimensional cislunar combat environment and used those combat models to advance
strategic thought on spacepower. Specifically, this dissertation explored the works of
Lanchester, Lotka, Volterra, Brackney, and Bonder while creating the Lanchester-LotkaVolterra Hybrid Model and adapting Brackney’s work to a three-dimensional
environment. Such innovations enable the application of these models to the space
warfare environment. The application of the three-dimensional Brackney model
demonstrated the importance in understanding whether an environment and the
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occupying belligerents compose a search-time-dominated or kill-time-dominated
battlespace.
In answering the question on what similarities exist between the reliability models
of large and small spacecraft, this dissertation concluded that the Weibull distribution and
at times its more specific form, the exponential distribution, can be useful in
characterizing the reliability of both large and small spacecraft. This work applied
established reliability modeling methods to a previously unevaluated data set to
characterize the reliability behavior of small spacecraft. This process determined the
presence of beneficial aging of which the Weibull distribution was able to effectively
characterize. In doing so, this work advanced the Kinetically-Aggregated Infrastructure
Revitalization of Spacecraft (KAIROS) concept.
In answering the question on how game theory, aggregated combat models, and
reliability models can be integrated to provide analysis for space combat, this dissertation
created an integrated parametric methodological framework capable of evaluating the
efficacy of heterogeneous force compositions in an elegant, flexible manner within an
operationally relevant timeframe. Furthermore, this research provided strong evidence for
the mutual validation between Media Interaction Warfare Theory and the methodological
framework presented in this work. In creating this framework, this research affords
decision-makers the opportunity to enhance the U.S. space security posture and promote
the safety and security of the United States. This work concludes that decision-makers of
the U.S. military should provide an impetus to the force modernization communities
(especially those of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force) to prioritize the
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development of a force composition capable of deterring or winning a space conflict with
a peer competitor. Modeling efforts such as the methodological framework presented in
this work can and should be used to prepare for conflict in the emerging space warfare
domain which has no precedent of large-scale conflict.
This dissertation addressed the problem statement by demonstrating the effective
distillation of heterogeneous force structures into the necessary parameter values for
utilization within differential parametric combat modeling. This dissertation achieved the
research objective of creating a methodological framework for the analysis of space
conflict between two heterogeneous belligerents using differential parametric combat
modeling.
7.2 Recommendations for Future Research
Recommendations for future research include


applying the methodological framework presented in this work and agentbased modeling methods to different initial conditions to understand if and
under what circumstances the two methods produce similar or dissimilar
results



contextualizing and applying the methodological framework to other
domains of conflict besides the space warfare domain



applying the novel game-theoretic concepts presented in this work to other
spheres such as strategic games, business, or biology



utilizing this framework to bring increased objectivity to the Department
of Defense (DoD) wargaming efforts
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using this methodological framework to inform game-theoretic system
design for U.S. space systems



applying this framework to specific real-world parameters for blue system
capabilities and red system capabilities

119

Bibliography
911Metallurgist. (2015, May 29). The Lunar Gold Rush: How Moon Mining Could Work.
Retrieved from NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory:
https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/the-lunar-gold-rush-how-moon-miningcould-work
Air Force Space Command. (2013). Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures White Paper. Retrieved from https://www.dtic.mil.
Alvisio, B. (2015). Development and Validation of an Electromagnetic Formation Flight
Simulation as a Platform for Control Algorithm Design. Thesis. Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Axelrod, R. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390-1396.
Barnett, A. (n.d.). Chandrayaan-1 / Moon Impact Probe. Retrieved from Solar System
Exploration: https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/missions/chandrayaan-1/in-depth/
Bonder, S., & Farrell, R. (1970). Development of Models for Defense Systems Planning .
Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan.
Brackney, H. (1959, January). The Dynamics of Military Combat. Operations Research,
7(1), 30-44.
Brown, O., & Eremenko, P. (2008). Fractionated Space Architectures: A Vision for
Responsive Space. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Carter, J. (2021, October 19). Space Mining: Scientists Discover Two Asteroids Whose
Precious Metals Would Exceed Global Reserves. Retrieved from Forbes:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiecartereurope/2021/10/19/the-age-of-spacemining-just-got-closer-as-scientists-discover-two-asteroids-whose-preciousmetals-would-exceed-global-reserves/?sh=2c6aee3e713b
Casella, G., & Berger, R. L. (2002). Statistical Inference: Second Edition . Belmont:
Brooks/Cole Cengage Learning.
Cristini, F. (2010). Satellite networks: solutions against emerging space threats. IFAC
Proceedings Volumes, 43(15), 380-385.

120

Daniels, M., & Pate-Cornell, M. E. (2015). Risk Aversion and Optimal Satellite Systems.
In IEEE Aerospace Conference (pp. 1-20). Big Sky, Montana.
Duke, M. B. (n.d.). Space Resources. Retrieved from Colorado School of Mines:
https://history.nasa.gov/DPT/Technology%20Priorities%20Recommendations/Sp
ace%20Resources%20DPT%20Boulder%2000.pdf
EconClips. (2018, July 23). The Tragedy of the Commons: How to Avoid It? Retrieved
from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLnA0AO2lXA&t=399s
Garner, R. (2021, April 14). OSIRIS-REx. Retrieved from NASA:
https://www.nasa.gov/osiris-rex
Glester, A. (2018, June 11). The asteroid trillionaires. Retrieved from Physics World:
https://physicsworld.com/a/the-asteroid-trillionaires/
Grego, L. (2012, January). A History of Anti-Satellite Programs. Retrieved from Union of
Concerned Scientists: https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/ahistory-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf
Harbaugh, J. (2021, March 5). STMD: Tech Demo Missions. Retrieved from NASA:
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/osam-2.html
Hardin, G. (1968, December 13). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859),
1243-1248.
Harrison, T., Johnson, K., & Roberts, T. (2018). Space Threat Assessment 2018.
Washington DC: CSIS.
Hayhurst, D., & Colombi, J. (2021). Game-Theoretic System Design in the Development
of Space Power. Air & Space Power Journal, 35(2).
Hayhurst, D., Bettinger, R., & Grandhi, R. (2021). Kinetically-Aggregated Infrastructure
Revitalization of Spacecraft (KAIROS). Dayton-Cincinnati: Dayton-Cincinnati
Aerospace Sciences Symposium.
Hayhurst, D., Bettinger, R., & Schubert Kabban, C. (2021). Survival Analysis for
Nanosatellites and Picosatellites. Small Satellite Conference (pp. 1-4). Logan:
Utah State University .

121

Hayhurst, D., Colombi, J., & Meyer, D. (2021). Aggregated space combat modeling.
Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation [online].
Hilton, A. R. (2015). A Performance-Driven Experiment Framework for Space
Technology Development Using the International Space Station. Doctoral
dissertation, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Ibrahim, A. (2015). The Tragedy of the Commons and Prisoner’s Dilemma May Improve
Our Realization of the Theory of Life and Provide Us with Advanced Therapeutic
Ways. ResearchGate, 1-11.
Jones, A. (2022, January 27). China’s Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard
orbit. Retrieved from Space News: https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/
Kingsland, S. (2015, August 4). Alfred J. Lotka and the origins of theoretical population
ecology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 112(31), 9493-9495.
Kong, E., Kwon, D., Schweighart, S., Elias, L., Sedwick, R., & Miller, D. (2004).
Electromagnetic Formation Flight for Multisatellite Arrays. Journal of Spacecraft
and Rockets, 41(4), 659-666.
Lanchester, F. (1916). Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm. London:
Constable and Company Limited.
Leyton-Brown, K., & Shoham, Y. (2008). Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise,
Multidisciplinary Introduction. Monee: Morgan & Claypool.
Linville, D., & Bettinger, R. (2020). An Argument against Satellite Resiliency:
Simplicity in the Face of Modern Satellite Design. Air & Space Power Journal,
34(1), 43-53.
Maccone, C. (2002, January). The lunar farside radio lab study of the IAA. Retrieved
from ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Locations-of-the-fiveEarth-Moon-Lagrangian-points-namely-where-the-Earth-andMoon_fig1_228781180
Maier, M. W., & Eberhardt, R. (2009). The Art of Systems Architecting. Boca Raton:
CRC Press.

122

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2016). Asteroid Mining. Retrieved from The
Future of Strategic Natural Resources:
https://web.mit.edu/12.000/www/m2016/finalwebsite/solutions/asteroids.html
Mathieu, C., & Weigel, A. L. (2005). Assessing the Flexibility Provided by Fractionated
Spacecraft. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics: Space 2005
Conference and Exposition. Long Beach: AIAA Space Forum.
Myers, S. L., & Chang, K. (2020, December 17). China brings moon rocks to earth, and
a new era of competition to space. Retrieved from The New York Times:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/science/china-moon-mission-rocks.html
Nakamoto, S. (n.d.). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. Retrieved from
bitcoin: https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
NASA. (n.d.). ExoMars 2016 Mission (ESA/Roscosmos). Retrieved from Mars
Exploration Program: https://mars.nasa.gov/mars-exploration/missions/esaexomars-2016-tgo/
NASA. (n.d.). Mars 2020 Mission Perseverence Rover. Retrieved from NASA Science:
https://mars.nasa.gov/mars2020/
NASIC Public Affairs Office. (2018). Competing in Space. WPAFB: National Air and
Space Intelligence Center.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2020, December 19). Earth’s
atmosphere stretches out to the moon - and beyond. Retrieved from Solar and
Heliospheric Observatory: https://soho.nascom.nasa.gov/hotshots/2019_02_20/
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2020, December 17). Artemis.
Retrieved from National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis/
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2020, December 19). The Artemis
Accords. Retrieved from National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed13Oct2020.pdf
Olson, J. (2014, October 8). Modelling Interspecific Competition . Retrieved December
20, 2020, from YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obasfCufOr0

123

O'Rourke, R. (2020, December 20). Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for
Defense—Issues for Congress. Retrieved from Congressional Research Service:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R43838.pdf
Perla, P., & Curry, J. (2011). The Art of Wargaming. Monee: United States Naval
Institute.
Pisacane, V. L. (2016). The Space Environment and its Effects on Space Systems 2nd ed.
Blacksburg: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
Roberts, T. (2021, March 31). Unusual Behavior in GEO: SJ-17. Retrieved from
Aerospace Security: https://aerospace.csis.org/data/unusual-behavior-in-geo-sj17/
Saleh, J. H., & Castet, J. (2010). Single Versus Mixture Weibull Distributions for
Nonparametric Satellite Reliability. Reliability Engineering and System Safety,
95(3), 295-300.
Scardera, M. P., & Cesul, B. T. (2021). Media Interaction Warfare Theory: A Novel
Analytic Process Supporting Space Warfare Planning Operations. Air & Space
Power Journal, 37-59.
Sellers, J. J. (2005). Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics 3rd ed. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Shekhtman, L. (2020, December 7). Asteroid Ryugu Dust Delivered to Earth; NASA
Astrobiologists Prepare to Probe It. Retrieved from NASA:
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2020/asteroid-ryugu-dust-delivered-toearth-nasa-astrobiologists-prepare-to-probe-it
Spaniel, W. (2015). Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook. Monee.
Spendel, D. F. (2018, March 23). Parameter Study of an Orbital Debris Defender Using
Two Team, Three Player Differential Game Theory. Retrieved from AFIT
Scholar: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/1785/
Stein, V. (2021, February 8). Tianwen-1: China's first Mars mission. Retrieved from
Space.com: https://www.space.com/tianwen-1.html
Tellis, A. J. (2019, April 15). India’s ASAT Test: An Incomplete Success. Retrieved from
Carnegie: Endowment for International Peace:

124

https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-successpub-78884
The European Space Agency. (n.d.). About Space Debris. Retrieved from European
Space Agency:
https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/About_space_debris
The Planetary Society. (n.d.). Chang'e-5: China's Moon sample return mission. Retrieved
from The Planetary Society: https://www.planetary.org/space-missions/change-5
U.S. Air Force. (2019). U.S. Air Force 2030 Science and Technology Strategy.
US Department of State. (1967, January 27). Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Retrieved from Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification, and Compliance: https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm
Walterscheid, R. L. (1989). Solar cycle effects on the upper atmosphere—implications
for satellite drag. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, 439-444.
Washburn, A., & Kress, M. (2009). Combat Modeling. New York: Springer.
Web of Stories – Life Stories of Remarkable People. (2017, March 14). John Maynard
Smith – Game Theory: The War of Attrition Game (46/102). Retrieved from
YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C7m_Qeo8CE0&list=PLVV0r6CmEsFzJSv
Ac4MBuUP_GrjO1lLHp&index=47
Williams, D. (2022, January 7). NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive.
Retrieved from NASA:
https://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft/display.action?id=2019-042A
Wolfe, F. (2021, November 15). Russian Direct Ascent ASAT Test Generates More Than
1,500 Pieces of Trackable Debris. Retrieved from Defense Daily:
https://www.defensedaily.com/russian-direct-ascent-asat-test-generates-morethan-1500-pieces-of-trackable-debris/space/

125

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the tim e for reviewing instructions, searching existing data
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect
of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations
and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
2. REPORT TYPE

09-09-2022

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

Sept 2019 – Jun 2022

Dissertation

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

TITLE AND SUBTITLE

A METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARAMETRIC COMBAT
ANALYSIS
6.

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER

AUTHOR(S)

Hayhurst, Dustin L., Major, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/ENV)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-8865

AFIT-ENV-DS-22-S-085

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

Intentionally left blank
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
DISTRUBTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This material is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States.
14. ABSTRACT

This work presents a taxonomic structure for understanding the tension between certain factors of stability for gametheoretic outcomes such as Nash optimality, Pareto optimality, and balance optimality and then applies such gametheoretic concepts to the advancement of strategic thought on spacepower. This work successfully adapts and applies
combat modeling theory to the evaluation of cislunar space conflict. This work provides evidence that the reliability
characteristics of small spacecraft share similarities to the reliability characteristics of large spacecraft. Using these novel
foundational concepts, this dissertation develops and presents a parametric methodological framework capable of
analyzing the efficacy of heterogeneous force compositions in the context of space warfare. This framework is shown to
be capable of predicting a stochastic distribution of numerical outcomes associated with various modes of conflict and
parameter values. Furthermore, this work demonstrates a general alignment in results between the game-theoretic
concepts of the framework and Media Interaction Warfare Theory in terms of evaluating force efficacy, providing strong
evidence for the validity of the methodological framework presented in this dissertation.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Game Theory, Probability Theory, Combat Modeling
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT

U

b. ABSTRACT

U

17. LIMITATION OF
ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

OF PAGES

John Colombi, AFIT/ENV

UU

139

c. THIS PAGE

U

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

john.colombi@afit.edu; 937-255-3636 x3347
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

